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I. INTRODUCTION
The basic goal of copyright law is, at a general level, fairly well understood,1
yet the law itself seems untethered to any consistent analytical approach designed
to achieve that goal. Take, for example, White-Smith Music Co. v. Apollo Co.,2 a
copyright standard from 1908. The question was whether producing piano rolls
that create the sound of preexisting compositions constituted "copying." The
Supreme Court held that it did not, reasoning that one could not actually look at
the holes in the rolls and see a version of the original composition. The import
of the decision was short-lived; the 1909 Copyright Act extended copyright
protection to the right to "reproduce mechanically the work."3
Although the outcome was altered, the Court's approach has an aimless quality
that persists. In this context, "aimless" is to be taken literally--one is hard
pressed to discern whether the Court has a specific objective much less one that
can be linked to the Constitutional enabling language that permits the enactment
of laws protecting intellectual property in order "[t]o promote the Progress of
Science and the Useful Arts." Most scholars agree that this language allows the
creation of intellectual property laws as a means of increasing social welfare.
Perhaps the best known and clearest statement is Justice Potter Stewart's
observation:
The limited scope of the copyright holder's statutory monopoly, like
the limited copyright duration required by the Constitution, reflects
a balance of competing claims upon the public interest: Creative
work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation
must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public
availability of literature, music and the other arts. The immediate
effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an
"author's" creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive,
to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good.4
See infra note 4 and accompanying text.
2 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 1, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909) (current version at 17 U.S.C. 5 107
(2003)).
4 Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156, 186 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 65, 67
(1975). See also Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219, 100 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 325, 333 (1954) ("The
economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the
conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public
welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in 'Science and useful Arts.' "); Fox Film v.
Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127, 13 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 243, 244 (1932) ("The sole interest of the United
States ... in conferring [a copyright] lie[s] in the general benefits derived by the public from the
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The approach called for is one that is economic in nature in that the social
welfare gains and losses resulting from protecting a particular work should be the
central concern of efforts to interpret intellectual property law.5 From an
economic perspective, the focus is on which outcome advances social welfare; all
the usual issues of copyright disputes and scholarship-What is copying? What
is creative? Is there authorship? Is there substantial similarity, etc.-are simply
means to that end. Yet, formalistic discussions, like the one found in White-Smith
Music,6 of the proper standards for creativity, copying, and similar copyright issues
appear to have no theoretical underpinning--economic or otherwise.
As a familiar example, consider the college student who downloads a song
without permission. This is literaly copying but, unless labeling the action copying
has some social significance, it makes little sense to engage in a great deal of
judicial and scholarly hand-wringing over the matter.7  If the student is
impoverished and would not have paid for the music, the composer and other
copyright-holders are no worse off and the student is better off. If anything,
there is social gain for the student who has not in any way interfered with the
ability of the composer or performer to sell his or her work to others.' On the
other hand, perhaps the student would have purchased the music, or maybe most
student copiers would have purchased the music. If this is the case, it may be too
Labors of authors.'); United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158, 77 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 243, 253 (1948) ("The copyright law, like the patent statute, makes reward to the owner a
secondary consideration."); and Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429, 220
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 665,672 (1984) ("The monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are neither
unlimited nor primarily designed to provide a special private benefit. Rather, the limited grant is a
means by which an important public purpose may be achieved.').
Similarly, according to the report of the Judicary Committee of the House of Representatives
accompanying the 1909 revisions:
In enacting a copyright law Congress must consider... two questions: First,
how much will the legislation stimulate the producer and so benefit the public,
and, second, how much will the monopoly granted be detrimental to the public.
The granting of such exclusive rights, under the proper terms and conditions,
confers a benefit upon the public that outweighs the evils of the temporary
monopoly.
H.R. REP. No. 2222, at 7.
s The most important work explaining the economic theory is William M. Landes & Richard
A. Posner, An EconomicAnaysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325 (1989).
6 209 U.S. at 18. The Court does note that the creation of the rolls may mean that others may
use the underlying composition without paying (and, therefore, discourage the promotion of science
and the useful arts). Id
7 The distinction between what is literally a violation and what is functionally a violation is
familiar to those who study antitrust law. See Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 441 U.S.
1, 201 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 497 (1979) (distinguishing "per se price fixing" from price fixing).
8 In fact, one could make the case that the copying results in a Pareto Superior outcome in that
at least one party is better off and no one else is worse off.
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expensive to distinguish among copiers who are too poor to purchase the music
and those who are not, and a broad rule is the most efficient way to administer
an economically sensible system of copyright even though the "wrong" decision
may result in some cases. But the truth is, most decisions reveal little of this type
of reasoning.
Justice Stewart's commentary suggests courts do seem to understand the
economic logic.9 They either are unwilling to follow the logic or to do so
expressly. In the Supreme Court's most recent copyright case, Elred v. Ashcroft,' °
the analysis is confined to Congressional authority to retroactively extend the
copyright term. The Court held that it did. The connection between retroactive
term extension and promoting "the Progress of Science of the Useful Arts" is
tenuous at best.1 And, although the Court addressed some economic concerns,
the effort to do so is poorly reasoned and seems like an afterthought. 2 What is
especially puzzling is that, in other areas of law, rules have evolved that can be
squared with efficiency even though there is no Constitutional or statutory
mandate. Copyright, even with Constitutional direction that is squarely utilitarian
in nature, seems adrift.
This Article has two goals. The first is to explain in some detail what
copyright law might look like if it reflected economic reasoning. The second is
to put to the test the question of whether copyright law is as far out of sync with
economic guidelines as cases ranging from White-Smith Music to Eldred suggest.
Although this introduction has stressed the economic irrationality of copyright
law, could it actually be that within copyright decisions there is an implicit
economic sensibility?
In order to understand the economic approach and the inconsistency of
copyright law, as well as the thesis of this article, it is necessary to understand the
concepts of "externalities" and "public goods." Externalities can be negative or
positive. In the context of actions that impose costs on others, the key concept
is "negative externalities"-the harm to others resulting from the activity of
another. There are good economic reasons for requiring those responsible for
"negative externalities" to internalkze (pay for) these costs, and the law reflects this
reasoning. Thus, a careless driver must pay for the harm to the property of
another. When it comes to copyright, the key concept is "positive
externality"-the benefits to others resulting from the activity of another. There
9 See supra note 4.
10 537 U.S. 186, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225 (2003).
" The Court sweeps aside an argument that one cannot motivate someone to create something
that already exists with reasoning that is flawed and inconsistent with other copyright limitations.
See infra text accompanying notes 89-98.
12 See discussion infra at notes 89-98.
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are also good economic reasons to permit those who create positive externalities
to be compensated by those who enjoy the benefits of those efforts. Thus, the
composer of a song that is performed by others is permitted to recover. This,
too, is internalization. In fact, intellectual property law, including its
Constitutional authorization, has internalization as its principal focus. 3
The underlying thesis of this Article is that positive and negative externalities
are complements, and it is important to treat them similarly. Legal scholarship
tends to address negative externalities disproportionately-in the interests of
"allocative efficiency."' 4 Allocative efficiency is not likely to be achieved, though,
by only treating one side of the externality problem. In the context of resource
allocation, this is the equivalent of exercising half of one's body or tuning half of
an automobile engine.
The analysis below begins, in Section A, with a more detailed discussion of
externalities. The key is to describe how the methods of treating negative
externalities can be converted to copyright law and positive externalities. 5 In
Section B, the theory of positive externalities is presented as two operational rules.
The first is to protect only works that create more social benefit than social cost.16
These are labeled "copyright-worthy." The second is to incur no greater social
cost than necessary to encourage the production of copyright-worthy works. 7
These two operational rules are refined throughout the Article in the context of
discussions of various copyright doctrines.
Section C examines copyright decisions in order to determine whether an
economic approach-either overt, implicit or intuitive'8-consistent with the first
" See sources cited supra note 4.
14 Allocative efficiency is said to occur as long as the resources used to produce an output are
less valued to society than the benefits from that output.
's For an earlier recognition of this analogy see generally, Wendy J. Gordon, Copyright as Tort
Law's MirrorImage: '-Iarms, ""enefits, "and the Uses andLimits ofAnalogy, 34 MCGEORGE L. REV. 533
(2003); Wendy J. Gordon, Of Harms and Benefits: Torts, Restitution, and Intellectual Property, 34
MCGEORGE L. REv. 541 (2003). For a more general discussion relating to these issues see Wendy
J. Gordon, An Inquiy Into the Merits of Copyright: The Cbalenges ofConsisteny, Consent, andEncouragement
Theory, 41 STAN. L. REv. 1343 (1989).
16 Social costs are a combination of private and public costs. In copyright, these costs include
the costs of exclusion, the public costs of administering a copyright system, and the private costs of
transactions and litigation resulting from a work being copyrighted.
17 The importance of viewing the economic task as including two steps can be understood by
comparing the view of one treatise writer that "the purpose of copyright is to stimulate the
production of the widest possible variety of creative goods at the lowest possible cost." PAUL
GOLDSTEIN, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAw 3 (2001). This view is quite different from the one
taken here and the one that would maximize social welfare. A system like that described in the quote
would be one that encourages all creativity, even that without much value, as long as whatever
creativity emerged was at the lowest cost.
"s For a similar evaluation of the common law, see RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMICANALYSIS
[Vol. 13:1
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rule has evolved. The finding of the analysis is that, on balance, copyright
opinions can be squared with an approach to positive externalities similar to that
applied to negative externalities. In Section D, the analysis turns to whether the
reasoning found in copyright decisions is consistent with the second rule. The
focus is on analysis as opposed to the outcomes of specific cases. Cases involving
duration, "new use," and "fair use" compose the universe of this analysis. Here,
the finding is that courts generally do not have an economically sound method of
minimizing the social costs of works that warrant protection. Sometimes courts
appear to be interested in goals other than maximizing social welfare, and, in
others, there appear to be no particular guiding principles.
Before continuing, two qualifications are in order. First, it is important to
note the obvious fact that law is not interpreted simply to advance economic
ends, and this Article does not make the claim that it should be. 9 Nevertheless,
there is near-universal agreement that intellectual property law in the United
States is centered around bringing forth the production of creative people. In this
context, more consciousness of positive externalities and how they mesh with
negative externalities is essential. In addition, even if one is uncomfortable with
the goals of efficiency or wealth maximization, it still makes sense to assess
whether copyright does, in fact, track these interests.
Second, this Article focuses on judicial holdings and opinions and the question
of whether these opinions are consistent with a theory of positive externalities.
The point has been made that both the common law2" and antitrust law2 (also a
form of common law2 ) arguably evolved to conform to standards of economic
efficiency. One may argue that despite uniform agreement that United States
copyright law is utilitarian in nature with the bottom line purpose to maximize
social welfare,23 the Act itself makes it impossible to adopt an economic approach
to positive externalities. It is true that the Act, reflecting powerful political
interests, is at times less about maximizing social welfare than it is about
determining how the profits from protected works are divided.24 On the other
OF LAW (5th ed. 1998).
19 The most obvious competing theory of copyright is based on the moral right of the author
and would extend protection on the basis of the principle that the work is an extension of the
author. Seegeneral/Tom G. Palmer,Arr Patents and Copyights Moral Justified? The Philosophy ofProperty
Rights and Ideal Objects, 13 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 817 (1990).
20 POSNER, supra note 18.
21 Roger D. Blair & Gordon L. Lang, Albrecht After Arco: Maximum Resak Price Fixing Moves
Toward the Rule of Reason, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1007 (1991).
' The Sherman Act provisions are very general and the substantive law of copyright is
essentially judge-made. See general# E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & JEFFREY L. HARRISON,
UNDERSTANDING ANTITRUST AND ITS ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS (2003).
23 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
24 Interestingly, if one reads the Act from cover to cover, the various sections can be seen as
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hand, there are many issues left sufficiently open for courts to adopt a sound
economically-oriented approach and to allow an analysis of whether this tendency
is present."
II. THE ECONOMICS OF NEGATIVE AND POSITIVE EXTERNALITIES
A. THE BASICS
26
Most people familiar with legal analysis know that a negative externality arises
when an activity by one party imposes a cost on another. Less attention has been
paid to the difference in the economic and legal consequences of positive
externalities. Suppose you make a living growing and selling apples. The cost to
you is $10 a bushel and you sell them for $12 a bushel, which is the measure of
the value buyers attribute to your apples. Periodically, you fertilize, and the run-
off from your field goes into an adjoining stream. People downstream who
would otherwise use the water find that they must use wells and bottled water
instead. The cost to them is $300 a year over what it would be if they could use
the stream. The cost to down stream residents is an externality. Suppose, if you
were required to pay this cost, the cost of apples per bushel would be $14. You
would have to charge at least that much and, consequently, you would not be in
the apple business. The key idea here is that it costs $14 to produce something
that society says is worth $12. Yet you will produce the apples because you are
able to shift $4 of the production cost to others.
No one questions whether an externality is involved here. That is a different
issue from the legal reaction. The law may or may not require you to internalize
the cost. It does this by declaring that the downstream residents have a right to
use the water. You can compensate the people downstream or attempt to find
a way to curb the run-off. The idea is that law complements economics here by
requiring the orchard owner to make decisions based on all the costs of
production as opposed to just those incurred directly.
either advancing the creation of intellectual property or providing guidelines for how the profits
from this activity is to be divided up. Economists say this second matter is a distributive concern.
By volume the Act is primarily devoted to distributive matters. SeeJeffrey L. Harrison, Rationafiing
the Allocative/Distributive Distinction in Copyight, 32 HOFSTRA L. REv. 853 (2004).
25 Although certainly subject to debate, the Act tends to be less precise and more open to
judicial interpretation in those areas that deal with what intellectual property is and what rights
authors have. These are the matters that concern this Article. The Act is more detailed and less
subject to judicial interpretation when addressing distributive matters.
' Readers familiar with the economics of negative and positive externalities may want to skip
this section.
[Vol. 13:1
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While externalities abound, the decision-perhaps the only relevant
one-about when to require compensation and internalization is a difficult one,
and not every person causing a negative externality is required to make
compensation. In addition, even when compensation is required, it may not be
equal to the full amount of the externality. The issues of establishing that a
negative externality is compensable and to what extent are the key to the analysis
that follows-but first a look at the complementary notion of positive
externalities.
In the context of positive externalities, it is also important to separate the
economic reality from the legal action. Suppose you are an industrious and
imaginative gardener. Your yard is a magnificent English garden that people
come from miles around to see. They drive down your street and marvel at the
beauty of your garden. They would pay to see the garden, but it is in plain view
and there is no way for you to close the public street and charge admission. As
an economic matter, there is no question that this is a positive externality. In
effect, your gardening is a "public good"27 and those looking but not paying are
"free-riders."
Your yard is actually smaller than it could be because, in order to support
yourself, you spend your time working as a salesperson in a tire store where you
earn $20,000 a year. In another town, a garden similar to yours can be found in
a secluded area that people must pay to enter. They happily pay $5.00 per viewing
and the total receipts are enough to provide a salary of $30,000. The point is that
your efforts as a landscaper would be more valuable to society than your efforts
as a salesperson in a tire store. It is because of your inability to internalize the
external benefits of your efforts that you do not work full-time in the more
productive and valued activity.
As with negative externalities, this is where the issue of a legal reaction arises.
The fact that a positive externality is in play does not mean that the law will
declare that the producer has a "right" to the benefits by collecting payments
from those who enjoy those benefits. Most of the time, these benefits remain
free-hence the term "free-riding." The free-riding in this case means you are
forever in a less productive occupation. In some instances, most notably
intellectual property, law attempts to complement economics. For example, if the
law permitted you to block your street and charge admission to your garden, you
would have an opportunity to test the market to see if you are more valued as a
' Public goods are those to which exclusivity does not apply. Without legal interventions it is
difficult or impossible to exclude "free-riders" from enjoying the benefits of what is produced.
Traditionally, things like national defense and police services are listed as public goods because, if
produced privately, those not paying for production would also benefit.
20051
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tire salesman or a gardener. Intellectual property laws, in effect, allow you to block
access to your creative efforts and charge admission.
The parallels in the analysis are fairly obvious.28 In the case of negative
externalities, the producer may produce too much because the costs incurred
(internalized) are lower than the total cost. In the case of positive externalities,
too little is produced because the producer is not fully rewarded for the
productive effort. More technically, we say that the outcomes are not allocatively
efficient. In the case of uncompensated negative externalities, resources are
directed into the production of apples even though people do not value the apples
as much as the cost of all resources needed to produce them. In the case of
positive externalities, resources are not devoted to your English garden even
though society values your efforts as a landscaper more than anything else you
could produce.
For allocative efficiency to occur, generally both types of externalities must be
treated. Although it is possible in the same market to have the overproduction
tendencies of negative externalities offset by the underproduction pull of positive
externalities, such an outcome would be pure happenstance. Plus, offsetting
externalities in a single market is not the real problem. The problem is that
resources that may be destined for different markets may be affected by both
negative and positive externalities. For example, suppose the apple farmer and
landscaper both use fertilizer. The demand for fertilizer will be relatively low for
landscaping because of the public good character of the landscaper output and
relatively high for the orchard owner because of negative externalities. Treating
just negative externalities is only a partial solution to the problem of fertilizer
misallocation.
Despite this balance in the importance of positive and negative externalities,
legislative and judicial treatment of the two is anything but balanced. Tort and
contract law as well as criminal law are responses to negative externalities. In these
contexts, there are solid indications that law either implicitly, expressly and
deliberately, or coincidentally furthers a goal of allocative efficiency. On the
other hand, in the context of intellectual property and copyright law in
particular-the chief legislative responses to positive externalities-one is hard-
pressed to find, at least on the surface, an underlying theme of allocative
efficiency. As already noted, part of what follows is an effort to pierce the surface
in order to determine whether there is an underlying allocative efficiency rationale.
First, however, a closer look at the treatment of negative externalities will serve
to introduce the comparison.
28 See Gordon, Tort Law's Mirror Image, supra note 15.
[Vol. 13:1
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B. THE TREATMENT OF NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES
Three areas of law are largely devoted to the internalization process. In tort
law, theories governing intentional harms, negligently-caused harms, and strict
liability provide the link between negative externalities and internalization. In
contract law, a breach harms the non-breaching party and the harm is internalized
through a finding of contract liability. The objectives of criminal law are more
diffuse, but one rationale for criminal law is that it informs people in advance that
they will be required to internalize the harm caused to others. Sentencing in
excess of actual harm is the result of the fact that not every person causing harm
will be required to internalize.29
There are complexities in the case of criminal law that make it a bit more
difficult to work with in terms of developing a theory, so the focus here is on tort
and contract law. Both areas involve a two-step internalization process. The first
step is the finding of liability, which can be viewed as a determination that those
affected negatively by the externality should be compensated. Or, put differently,
it is a decision that internalization must occur. The second step is the assessment
of damages. Having determined that a compensable externality has occurred,
what amount should be internalized?
This two-step process can be converted to the assessment of positive
externalities. A finding that an author has created a protected work and that there
is a copyright violation is the "positive externality" side of a finding that a
compensable negative externality has occurred. Similarly, defining the breadth of
that protection and determining the damages awarded is comparable to a
determination of the extent to which the positive externality can be internalized.
Given the similarity in the analysis, it is useful to take a closer look at the
economic standards that arguably underlie the negative externality analysis of tort
and contract law. Two related concepts are involved here: risk allocation and cost
minimization. The risks of losses are allocated in a manner that minimizes the
social costs of these losses. In contracts, the risk of non-performance is almost
always allocated to the breaching party subject to doctrines like impossibility,
mutual mistake, and the like. The rationale is that the party who has promised to
perform is in the best position to anticipate factors that may lead him or her to
be unable to perform or just to prefer not to perform. In effect, the party wishing
to breach sees that it is more expensive 30 to perform than anticipated. From this
' In effect, the harm caused by each act may be only $100 but nine of ten criminal acts go
undected. Thus, if a $100 fine were imposed, the expected penalty would be only $10. To offset
this effect, the actual penalty is raised to a multiple of the actual harm.
30 This could be in terms of the actual cost to perform or the opportunity cost of not breaching
and performing for a higher bidder.
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perspective, performance is a losing proposition. In extreme and rare
circumstances, non-performance is not a breach. One could analogize this in tort
law to a determination that the costs of avoiding the harm would have exceeded
the harm itself. In general, though, the party wishing to breach must compare his
or her loss from performing with the loss to the other party, in terms of
expectancy, and choose the less expensive alternative.
Possibly more important than the finding of liability in a contract breach is the
determination of damages. What we know is that sometimes there are damages
resulting from a breach that cannot be recovered. However expressed, the rule
of Hadgy v. Baxendale is one that put limits on the breaching party's liability. 31 In
effect, the breaching party is not liable for every negative externality stemming
from the breach. One way to express this limitation is that there are certain
external effects that are so disconnected from the anticipation of the breaching
party that it makes little economic sense-in terms of minimizing costs-to
allocate the loss to the breaching party. It is this disconnectedness or irrelevance
with respect to decisionmaking that is key to understanding the application of
these principles to positive externalities as set out below.
The same themes appear in the context of tort liability. As in contract law, the
underlying theme is to allocate risk in a way that minimizes the cost of intentional
torts and accidents. In the case of intentional torts, the liability issue is relatively
uncomplicated. Like the party who breaches a contract, from an economic
standpoint there is a choice made between injuring another and paying damages
or not committing the tort. In the case of accidents, the analysis is more complex
but centers around minimizing the costs of accidents.32 Ideally, two steps are
involved. First, what would it cost the respective parties to avoid the accident?
If the expected cost of the accident was higher than the cost of avoidance, the
party who is the lowest-cost-avoider is liable. If neither party could avoid the
accident at a cost that is lower than the expected harm, the law disfavors the use
of resources to avoid the accident and there would be no liability.33 The general
analysis is relatively simple. It is efficient to avoid accidents that have a higher
expected cost than their cost of avoidance, and the party who should avoid the
accident is the party who could do it least expensively. In torts, the concept of
"proximate cause" serves the role of limiting one party's liability for the negative
externalities his or her actions may have caused in fact but which are so remote
or unlikely to occur that it makes little economic sense to require internalization.
11 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
32 GUIDO CALABREsI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS (1970).
33 Debates exist as to whether the current pervasive use of comparative negligence is consistent
with the economic ideal.
[Vol. 13:1
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Strict liability, or liability without negligence, may seem to veer away from
cost-minimization efforts by virtue of the fact that the strictly liable party may not
be the lowest-cost- avoider of the harm. In fact, there are two factors that seem
consistent with most, if not all, strict liability cases. First, the party that is
determined to be strictly liable is very likely to be the best cost-avoider. Cases
involving products liability and keeping wild animals are good examples of this.
Second, strict liability is most appropriate when the harmful conduct is
continuing. In these instances, the calculation of what would be cost-minimizing
is slightly different. 4
The perhaps obvious point is that these areas of law have developed ways of
determining when negative externalities should be internalized and the degree to
which that internalization should take place. The theories are not necessarily
consistent with economic efficiency across the board. After all, the common law
itself does not compel an evolution toward rules that favor efficiency. Still, a solid
argument has been made that the rules that have evolved are generally consistent
with efficiency.
C. TRANSFERRING THE ANALYSIS TO POSITIVE EXTERNALITIES
In the case of copyright and positive externalities, the perspective changes but
the analysis remains fundamentally the same. Thus, contract and tort rules can
be seen to have dual goals of encouraging internalization of negative externalities
as a means of achieving aliocative efficiency and encouraging the minimization of
the costs of harms.3" Copyright law is designed to encourage allocatively efficient
levels of positive externalities and to minimize the social cost of those benefits.
In the context of negative externalities, the principal concept is that of allocation
of risk with respect to harms. In the case of positive externalities, the creative
person similarly is assigned a risk (in this case, of a gain) in a manner that is
designed to maximize benefits.
Three clarifications will bring the comparison into sharper focus. First, in the
context of copyright, the objective is not to maximize total gains resulting from
creativity. Protection of these gains results in costs. The objective is to maximize
net social gains. If the net social gains are negative, the effort should not be
3' The standard example would be blasting. The cost of not blasting might be higher than the
harm of the windows broken by a blast. The blaster would not be negligent. On the other hand,
the cost of stopping the entire practice of blasting might be less than the cost of the harm caused
when all incidents are added together. The practice of blasting may be inefficient while each incident
might appear to be efficient. As Professor Shavell has argued, strict liability causes one to consider
the level of the activity. Seegeneral# STEPHEN SHAvELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAw
(1987).
35 This latter goal is referred to as productive efficiency.
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protected. Second, these costs are of three types. The first cost is that of
administering a copyright system. This general category includes all public costs
associated with deciding legal disputes and maintaining a public system of record-
keeping. The second cost includes private costs associated with transactions
between parties that arise from copyright law. In effect, copyright protection, by
virtue of exclusivity, requires parties to transact about the use of protected
works. 36 The third cost is that associated with the exclusivity itself as measured
by the benefits lost by virtue of the fact that others cannot use the original
expression of the copyright holder. Third, when comparing gains with losses, the
relevant comparison is between total benefits and total costs of bringing a work
into existence assuming the work is produced at the lowest possible social CoSt.
37
Thus, two limits on the process of internalizing positive externalities come
into play. The first is that benefits are internalized as long as, under the most
efficient method of protection, the costs of internalization do not exceed the
benefits society derives from the creative efforts. Stated differently, the creative
effort may produce external benefits but, if the costs of author internalization
exceed these benefits, they should not be incurred and the work should not be
protected. Works that fail that standard are not "copyright-worthy." In torts, the
corollary would be the choice not to avoid accidents that are more costly to avoid
than the harm caused. In contracts, a related concept is the choice to excuse
performance under some circumstances.
The second condition is that the benefits derived from the creative effort
should be obtained at the lowest possible social cost. Put differently, as long as
the creative effort is put forward, there is no need to incur costs to protect
benefits beyond this minimum. These extra benefits, like damages that are not
"foreseeable" under the Hadly v. Baxendale rule in contracts or proximately related
to the harm in the torts context, are irrelevant to the author's decisionmaking.
38
Any protection beyond the minimum necessary does not increase the social
benefit of the work and is burdensome in terms of administrative, transaction,
and exclusivity costs.
In sum, an economic approach to positive externalities would observe two
rules:
1. Internalization of positive externalities will be facilitated as long
as the cost of the facilitation does not exceed the social benefits of
the work.
36 The obvious exception is "fair use."
3 This would be a comparison of the marginal cost and marginal benefit of a specific work.
3 There is an obvious relationship between these two goals. As the cost of internalization
decreases, it becomes efficient to encourage higher levels of creativity.
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2. No costs beyond the minimum necessary to bring copyright-
worthy works into existence should be incurred.
III. MAKING THE RULES OPERATIVE
It would be convenient if these two rules could be translated to copyright law
directly. They cannot be, and the purpose of this final discussion before
examining the law is to describe how these economic questions can be framed
and asked in the context of actual cases.
A. INTERNALIZATION OF POSITIVE EXTERNALITIES WILL BE FACILITATED AS
LONG AS THE COST OF THE FACILITATION DOES NOT EXCEED THE SOCIAL
BENEFITS OF THE WORK
The first rule concerns whether a work should be protected at all. More
specifically, have copyright doctrines developed that distinguish works for which
costs of internalization are less than positive externalities from those in which
these costs are more? The issue is raised below in a number of contexts, but an
example may be useful to illustrate how the analysis is applied, how difficult it can
be, and why there may not be a clear answer.
At least one doctrine-the "modicum" standard articulated in Feist
Publicaions, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co. 39 -seems, on first impression, to be
inconsistent with an economically rational approach to positive externalities.
"Modicum works" offer little in the way of public benefits. Specifically, it is
unrealistic to believe that each work possessing a modicum of creativity is
copyright-worthy. In most cases the costs of protection are likely to exceed the
public benefits, resulting in a net loss. On the other hand, it is not clear that
"modicum works" result in much of a burden to others in terms of exclusivity.
One reason for this is that substitute creative works are readily available. 4° In
addition, the fact that works with very little creativity receive "thin" protection
suggests that a sensitivity to the benefits and costs of protection already exists in
the courts.4 1
The question of whether any particular work should be protected when it
exhibits only a modicum of creativity is a different question from whether the
overall "modicum" policy results in net loss. A more exacting analysis by the
courts of each work gives rise to additional costs. The bigger question is whether
a more expensive process of separating works that result in a net gain from those
19 499 U.S. 340, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1275 (1991).
0 See Harrison, supra note 24.
4' For examples see infra text accompanying notes 49-67.
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resulting in a net loss is worth the costs. This is obviously an empirical question.
In effect, when all factors are considered, it is not clear that a rule protecting
works containing only slight creativity is necessarily an inefficient one from the
standpoint of positive externalities.
B. NO COSTS BEYOND THE MINIMUM NECESSARY TO BRING COPYRIGHT-
WORTHY WORKS INTO EXISTENCE SHOULD BE EXPENDED
This second question is the one that is synonymous with Hadley v. Baxendale
in contract law and proximity requirements in tort law. More specifically, when
there is copyright protection, does there appear to be any effort made to tailor
that protection so that it does not exceed the minimum necessary? Again, there
is a temptation to conclude that there is not. Observations of "no more than
necessary" standards would seem to require attention to copyright terms, the
implications of new technology, and fair use standards. The answer may appear
to be easy with respect to two of these. Copyright terms may vary but not in a
way that is consistent with economic standards. Fair use, on the other hand, can
clearly be applied in a manner to promote economic ends and, in particular,
ensure that protection is no more extensive than necessary.
Again, it may be useful to examine how to approach this question in the
context of a specific example. In White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., the
issue of whether the compositions involved were "copyright-worthy" was not in
question.4" If it were, a finding that the positive externalities flowing from original
musical compositions typically exceed administrative, transaction, and exclusion
costs would likely have been economically sound.
With respect to the "no more than necessary rule," it is possible-perhaps
surprisingly-that the decision reflects an economically correct outcome. The
question is whether it was necessary to further burden third parties in order to
draw forth creative efforts.43 Put in terms discussed here, the question could be
framed: Was it reasonably foreseeable by the authors that revenues would be
forthcoming from the licensing of the composition to producers of piano rolls?
And, further, was this possibility part of the incentive to compose music? Thus,
one interpretation of the case is that composers of music are not motivated by the
possibility that an unforeseen technology will develop that will allow the
performance of a composition by new means. In effect, the revenues from
42 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
"3 It is important to note that "creative effort" actually has two contexts. Obviously, already-
produced works can be used without affecting their availability. On the other hand, a failure to
protect these works and to uphold what might be called the implicit bargain between the State and
authors, has an impact on current and future creative incentives.
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licensing piano roll manufacturers was not sufficiently "proximate" to the creation
of the original compositions to require assignment of that income to the
composers.
This is not to say that this economic interpretation is correct as an empirical
matter. There is little in the opinion to suggest even an implicit economic
analysis. On the other hand, there may be an instinctive and subtle economic
process at work. In particular, the Court focused on whether one could look at
the rolls and read the music as one could read it off of sheet music. In other
words, were piano rolls substitutes in the market for sales that composers might
fairly be said to have expected and based their decisions on? The holding is, in
effect, that the protection to piano rolls was more than necessary to call forth the
creative efforts.
The possible economic rationality of White-Smith Music may be better
appreciated by comparing the economic impact of the treatment of the same
issue in the 1909 and 1976 Copyright Acts. As already noted, the 1909 Act
extended copyright control to mechanical reproductions. The 1976 Act goes
another step by extending copyright control to phonorecords. Phonorecords are
defined as "material objects .. . fixed by any method now known or later
developed."' In effect, all benefits are to be internalized no matter how remote the
likelihood that those benefits will occur. If this policy were extended to contracts,
the Hadey v. Baxendale rule would not exist; and in torts, the proximate cause
limitations would be eliminated. Instead, in those areas of law, defendants would
be liable for all damages-even those that are unknowable and, thus,
disconnected from the decision to take an action in the first place.
IV. COPYRIGHT LAW AND POSITiVE EXTERNALITIES:
THE THRESHOLD QUESTION
The first question in the context of a negative externality is whether the cost
of avoidance exceeds the cost of the externality itself. In the context of positive
externalities, the comparable question is whether the positive externalities exceed
the cost of the process of ensuring that those externalities are internalized by the
author. At first, it appears that copyright law has done a fairly poor job in this
regard. There are a number of reasons for taking this view. As discussed above,
under what has come to be known as the "modicum" standard for creativity, only
minimal creativity can set the copyright apparatus into motion. Minimal creativity
is unlikely to give rise to much in the way of positive externalities; but it can set
off an expensive process of protecting the rights to internalize those
- 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2003) (emphasis added).
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externalities.4" Relating this back to negative externalities, this would be
comparable to using an expensive process to hold people liable for harms that are
very minor. In effect, the administrative cost exceeds the gains made by accident
avoidance.
Second, in copyright the concept of authorship has very little meaning. For
example, one can be the author of an expression that he or she did not intend.4
What this means is that works that may result in positive externalities but which
require no incentive by society to bring forth are nonetheless protected. Relating
this back to negative externalities, this would be comparable to holding an
individual liable for harms that are disconnected from his or her ability to avoid
or react to such harms.
Finally, copyright has the odd character of protecting positive externalities
when the work would have been created even without this extra cost to society.
It is hard to imagine that the predictable designs on things like greeting cards
47
and beach towels48 are driven by the desire to reap the benefits of being able to
internalize positive externalities. A great deal of this generic art is more likely
driven by the need to achieve temporary product differentiation in order to
remain competitive. Any extra benefits derived from copyright protection are
more likely to be in the nature of a windfall. Again, in terms of negative
externalities, this is like awarding extra damages when a certain amount of damage
or just internal necessity creates an incentive to minimize accident costs.
In fact, when it comes to the question of whether creative people should be
able to invoke the legal system in order to internalize positive externalities at all,
the legal system does not seem to perform as well as it does in the context of the
complementary problem of negative externalities. A closer look, however,
suggests that this may be too harsh a judgement. The analytical process by which
copyright law is applied and several of the doctrines that have emerged actually
can be squared with a rational positive externalities approach. The next section
focuses on the process and these doctrines while the following one examines the
special case of derivative works.
s See Harrison, supra note 24, at 856-57.
See Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99,90 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 153 (2d Cir.
1951).
17 See Harrison, supra note 24, at 868-69.
" See Sherry Mfg. Co. v. Towel King of Fla., Inc., 753 F.2d 1565, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1005
(11 th Cir. 1985).
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A. ABSTRACTION, THINNING, AND EFFICIENCY
The notion of "thin" in copyright law refers to the fact that works with little
creativity have only slight protection. Here the concept of "thinning" refers to
the process of taking out of play those elements of a work that are not protected.
Thinness and the thinning process are a natural extension of the standard that for
an infringement to occur, the infringing work must be substantially similar to the
protected elements of the work.49 Obviously, the actual question in terms of a
copyright infringement is whether the infringing work is substantially similar to
the protected elements of the original work. Elements are eliminated from the
sphere of protection for a variety of reasons including: they are facts, scenes afaire,
not original, or that protection would amount to allowing copyright of an idea or
a process. After the thinning process, works evidencing very little creativity end
up with thin protection, and everything else they contain can be freely taken.
The important question is whether, from an economic perspective, the
thinning process plays a role in copyright comparable to a finding of no liability
in the context of contract and tort law. In tort law, the crucial question is whether
the defendant owed or did not owe a duty to the plaintiff. The determining factor
as an economic matter is whether the cost of observing that duty exceeds the
benefits. In copyright, the decision to take an element out of play amounts to a
decision that there is no duty by a potential infringer not to take that element of
another's work.
Before looking at the question in some detail, it is important to note that the
process of thinning itself can result in costs even when protection is correctly
denied. First and most obviously, the process often requires an extended and
expensive period of litigation. Second, the process of separating protected from
unprotected elements is a subjective one and can increase risks to authors. In a
general sense, this risk is a cost to all those engaged in creative efforts and may
deter those who work within the gray areas of what is protected and not
protected.5 °
Perhaps not coincidentally, the thinning process and its economic rationality
owes a great deal to Judge Hand's opinion in the seminal case, Nichols v. Universal
Pictures Corp.5' Judge Hand, in the context to two thematically similar plays,
" This treatment of thinness is suggested in 1 WILLIAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW AND
PRACTicE 607, n.369 (1994). An alternative interpretation of thinness and its implications for the
substantial similarity test is offered in MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 13.03[A] at 13-28 (2000).
50 The most obvious example outside of intellectual property law is antitrust law. In antitrust
a lack of clarity about which practices are procompetitive or anticompetitive may discourage
practices that are ultimately beneficial to consumers.
" 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930).
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describes the process of abstracting-or, in modem parlance, disassembling-a
work. He writes:
Upon any work, and especially upon a play, a great number of
patterns of increasing generality will fit equally well, as more and
more of the incident is left out. The last may-perhaps be no more
than the most general statement of what the play is about, and at
times might consist only of its title; but there is a point in this series
of abstractions where they are no longer protected, since otherwise
the playwright could prevent the use of his "ideas," to which, apart
from their expression, his property is never extended. '12
While Judge Hand's discussion is best known for its description of the
abstracting process, the economically important excerpt is that in which he
observes that "property is never extended" to ideas.5 3 Ideas fall outside the scope
of protection even though they may be highly original and the result of the work
of the most creative minds. The reason for not protecting ideas is that the costs
of protection will in general exceed the social benefits of protection. This is not
to say that ideas may not be original and enormously important. Instead, the key
is that protecting them so that the "author" internalizes those benefits is
expensive. In the case of ideas, the specific social cost involved would be those
stemming from exclusion of others.
The connection between abstraction and the separation of different expressive
elements is also found in the analysis of scenes afaire. "Scenes afaire" refers to
"scenes that flow naturally from unprotectable basic plot premises." 4  For
example, a western movie is likely to contain a saloon scene, people in western
attire, wood frame buildings, and calico fabrics. To allow these elements to be
protected would be tantamount to protecting the idea of a play or movie set in the
old west. A good recent example is Metcaff v. Bochco,ss in which the authors of a
television screenplay sued Steven Bochco, the producer of a number of popular
television series. In this case, the series in question was "City of Angels," a
Bochco production that plaintiffs claimed was an infringement of their own
screenplay. Both works were about county hospitals in inner-city Los Angeles.
One cannot copyright the idea of a hospital drama set in an inner city hospital.
52 Id. at 121.
53 Id
54 Metcalf v. Bochco, 294 F.3d 1069, 1074, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1412, 1415 (9th Cir. 2002).
Scenes afaire can also be found in the context of musical compositions. See Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d
841 (9th Cit. 2004).
15 294 F.3d at 1069.
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That setting necessarily calls for plots that raise issues of race, poverty, and
romantic involvements among the staff. In effect, these elements "go with the
territory," and if they are protected the effect is to foreclose the idea or premise
to others. This can be more costly than the benefit that would derive from any
one work. Of course, at some point, and as was noted by the Bocbco case, the
similarities are not a necessary extension of the basic idea or dramatic premise,
and those elements fall into the protected sphere. 6
The leading recent case noting just how thin protection may become is Feist
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone, 7 in which the plaintiff claimed that the use by
the defendant of its telephone listings in order to produce its own directory was
an infringement. The Court noted that a telephone directory is a factual
compilation and that facts are not copyrightable.58 In effect, by peeling away what
was unprotected, the court granted very thin protection for the selection and
arrangement of facts.59 The decision makes sense in many respects from an
economic perspective. Although a comprehensive list of telephone numbers is
certainly the source of huge positive externalities, the granting of a monopoly over
the publication of that information is also very costly. In addition, some facts are
readily available and others difficult to establish. Allowing protection of facts
would mean a huge windfall for those who generate facts with little effort. A
holding that is more equivocal than Feist on the matter of protecting factual
information would likely give rise to repeated and costly incidents in which the
exclusive right to factual information is litigated and which would preclude others
from the republication of facts.
6 Id. In Bocbco, not only were there similarities in the setting, but the two works both featured
"young good-looking, muscular black surgeons who grew up in the neighborhood ...... Id at 1073.
In addition, both central figures were divorced without children and involved in the same overriding
struggle relating to hospital accreditation. Id. See also Murray Hill Publ'ns, Inc. v. Twentieth Century
Fox Film Corp., 361 F.3d 312, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1220 (6th Cir. 2004).
5 499 U.S. 340, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1275 (1991).
58 Id. at 363.
59 Id. at 349.
6 Generally, the opinion is consistent with economic efficiency. This may not be the case when
it comes to the Court's treatment of sweat of the brow. Specifically, the Court rejected the idea that
copyright law should be used to allow internalization of positive externalities resulting from the
"sweat of the brow" of the author. In other words, copyright is designed to protect the fruits of
creativity, not effort or investment. Id. at 354. In reality, even that part of the opinion is probably
consistent with economic theory. The important issue is what the author has produced and the cost
of protecting it. Sweat of the brow is typically raised when the arguably protected element is factual
in nature. In these instances, the social cost of protection is high and only in exceptional
circumstances would this cost be justified by the benefit of the discovery of facts.
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Another useful example of an economically sensible outcome is Beaudin v. Ben
and Jerty's Homemade, Inc.,61 a Second Circuit case in which the plaintiff designed
hats colored with black and white Holstein cow-like splotches. The plaintiff sold
several hats to Ben and Jerry's for resale in a store. Later, Ben & Jerry's had the
hats manufactured by others and Beaudin claimed the new caps constituted an
infringement. The court reasoned that it was doubtful that Beaudin had created
anything that was protectable. In particular, the court was concerned that finding
the cow splotches protectable would mean that anyone else who got the idea of
representing the cow splotches in works would run the risk of infringing
Beaudin's work.62 Rather than hold that the work was unprotectable, the court
went on to hold that even if some element of the hats was protectable, the
protection was very thin and the Ben &Jerry's renditions were not substantially
similar to that small protected interest.
63
From an economic perspective, the holding amounted to a determination that
cow-splotch hats were unlikely to ever be protected. In effect, whatever positive
externalities might flow from the creative effort were exceeded by the costs to
others of protecting that interest. The risk that others would feel constrained
from using a similar design was a cost the court specifically discussed as
something to be avoided. What distinguishes this case is that it was not difficult
for the costs of protection to exceed the benefits because the "creativity" of
taking a pattern found in nature and transferring it to hats or fabric is hardly
substantial.
Similar recognition of the costliness of overprotection is noted in Satava v.
Lowy, 64 a decision by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. In that case, an
artist created glass-in-glass sculptures that appeared to be jellyfish encased in a
plastic bubble. The works were seen by another artist who began creating the
same types of works. The lower court held that the works of the second artist
were infringing. The Court of Appeals reversed, reasoning that "no copyright
protection may be afforded to the idea of producing a glass-in-glass jellyfish
sculpture or to the elements of expression that naturally flow from the ideas of
such a sculpture." '65 The court went on to describe the remaining protection as
thin and extending only to the "distinctive curls of particular tendrils," the
"arrangement of certain hues," and the shape of the overall sculpture.6 6 Again,
the thinning process eliminated a "no-copying duty" from elements that it would
61 95 F.3d 1, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1959 (2d Cir. 1996).
62 Id. at 2.
63 Id
6 323 F.3d 805, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1206 (9th Cir. 2003).
65 Id. at 810.
66 Id. at 812.
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have been excessively costly to protect. For example, even a decision to allow
protection of glass-encased jellyfish sculptures could lead to repeated issues about
jellyfish versus other colored glass shapes within clear glass. In addition, it is not
at all clear that the positive externalities of jellyfish in glass are great or that a
decision denying protection will lead to a decline in production. In effect,
regardless of the merits of these works, the costs of their protection would seem
to exceed any social benefits.
As Feist, Beaudin, and Satava indicate, sometimes the thinning process means
there is little left to protect at all. In the cases in which the thinning process leads
to "thin" protection in an absolute sense, the question arises of why to offer
protection at all. Put differently, are the positive externalities associated with
thinly protected works ever great enough to justify any administrative and
exclusion costs? This is an empirical question, but for the most part it appears
that leaving an author with thin protection does little harm. First, thin protection
means there is little in the way of exclusion costs. Second, by narrowing
protection to details like the exact curl of a jellyfish's tendril or the curve of a
cow's spot, the focus of whether copying has occurred and whether works are
substantially similar is likewise narrowed and, thus, administrative costs are
reduced. Finally, the outcome of thin protection is probably rarely what an author
is aiming for. It may be all that is left after a serious effort. Shifting "thin
protection" to "no protection" may discourage risky creative efforts, especially
along the lines of minimalist expression.
In general, the abstracting and the thinning that follows seem to be roughly
consistent with what an economically-based approach to copyright and positive
externalities would suggest. The basic pieces that are culled out and put into the
no-liability category-ideas, expressions that necessarily flow from ideas,
processes, scenes afaire, facts, and useful articles-are elements that, if protected,
would impose substantial costs on the public. Moreover, since they are necessary
parts of a great many types of expression, there is little likelihood that the public
will lose the benefits of their expression if they are not protected. For example,
a western movie might include the typical saloon, western-style clothes, and calico
patterns on fabrics. Finding that these scenes afaire are unprotected has no impact
on an author's incentive to incorporate these elements into a future work since
they are required elements in any future effort to evoke a western theme. In
general, many of the distinctions made between what is copyright-worthy and
what is not can be seen as an effort to balance First Amendment rights with
copyright law.67 It is likely that the same distinctions would be made if the issue
67 See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter's, 471 U.S. 539, 555-60, 225 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 1073, 1079-81 (1985).
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were assigned to an economist bent on an efficient approach to copyright
protection.
B. DERIVATIVE WORKS
One of the more direct and obvious efforts to incorporate a rational economic
approach to positive externalities and copyright has come in the context of
derivative works. Two cases stand out. The first is L- Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyde,
8
in which the Second Circuit Court of Appeals was faced with two authors who
had created derivative works based on the "Uncle Sam" mechanical bank. Snyder
first produced scaled-down plastic versions of the bank and obtained a copyright
registration. He was followed by Batlin, who attempted to import his version
from Hong Kong but was informed that his banks were covered by Snyder's
copyright.69 Batlin filed an action to enjoin Snyder from enforcing his copyright.
The issue was whether Snyder's work contained sufficient originality to warrant
copyright protection. According to Judge Oaks, this required more than trivial
variation from the original. Accordingly, for a derivative work to be protected,
"[a] considerably higher degree of skill is required, true artistic skill, to make the
reproduction copyrightable."7 ° One of the rationales employed by the court was
the hazard of permitting the protection of derivative works with minor changes
from the original. Thus, "[t]o extend copyrightability to minuscule variations
would simply put a weapon for harassment in the hands of mischievous copiers
intent on appropriating and monopolizing public domain work.",
71
More direct in its economic concerns is Gracen v. Bradford Exchange.72 Gracen
entered a contest to create paintings based on the Judy Garland character,
Dorothy, from the Wizard of Oz. As the winner, Gracen was eligible to enter
into a contract with a firm, the Bradford Exchange, that had acquired the rights
to make collector plates based on the film. Gracen rejected the contract terms
and the Bradford Exchange employed another artist who created the painting for
Dorothy after seeing Gracen's work. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
assumed that the plates were identical to Gracen's painting but held that there was
no copyright infringement.73
The issue in this regard was whether Gracen's derivative work was
copyrightable in the first place. If it was, the second artist could be an
68 536 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1976).
69 Id at 489.
70 Id. at 491.
71 Id at 492.
72 698 F.2d 300, 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1294 (7th Cir. 1983).
73 Id. at 302.
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unauthorized copier. If not, he or she could freely copy and not be engaged in
an infringement. The Court held that Gracen's work was not copyrightable,
noting a difference between "artistic originality" and "the legal concept of
originality. '74 Legal originality, in the context of derivative works, according to
the court requires the derivative work to be "substantially different from the
underlying work. ' 75 According to Judge Posner, the legal function of originality
in the context of derivative works is to avoid overlapping claims. He offered the
example of artists attempting to copy the Mona Lisa. When working from an
existing work, the derivative works will all necessarily bear a resemblance to each
other. What will not be clear is whether any artist after the first derivative work
actually copied the original or the derivative work.
The economic sensibility of Batin and Gracen is clear. Some works are likely
to generate costs that are high relative to the positive externalities they produce.
In the case of derivative works, two types of dangers emerge. First, unless the
derivative works are substantially different from the original and each other, it is
unlikely that the second one will have added much to social welfare. On the other
hand, both authors may claim a right to internalize that benefit. This means
additional cost with no increase in benefits. Second, some derivative works
involve changing the form of the original while doing very little else.7 6 In these
instances, protecting the derivative work creates the risk of granting the author
a monopoly over that new form of reproduction. Although the precise economic
outcome is an empirical question, one can understand the rationale for requiring
derivative works to meet a higher standard of originality.
Batlin and, in particular, Gracen have been criticized,77 typically by those who
lose sight of copyright as a social welfare tool or reject that point of view. For
example, one author writes, in questioning Batin and Gracen, "[s]uffice it to say
that the concept of originality in copyright has as its purpose promoting the
progress of learning, culture and entertainment, and not sheltering persons who
are indisputably engaged in unauthorized copying."" Obviously, the reasoning
begs the question of what is unauthorized copying. The producer of a second
derivative work is not engaged in unauthorized copying if the creator of the first
derivative work does not have copyright protection. As an economic matter, the
74 Id. at 304.
71 Id at 305.
76 See also Entm't Research Group, Inc. v. Genesis Creative Group, Inc. 122 F.3d 1211, 43
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (9th Cir. 1997).
77 SeeJane C. Ginzberg, The Concept ofAuthorship in Comparative CopyrightLaw, 52 DEPAuLL. REV.
1063 (2003); Robert A. Gorman, CopJyight Courts and Aesthetic Judgments: Abuse or Necessity?, 25
COLUM.J.L. &ARTs 1 (2001);John Shepard Wiley, Copyight at the Schoolof Patent, 58 U. CHI. L. REv.
119 (1991).
78 Gorman, supra note 77, at 6.
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first work is not copyright-worthy unless it is meaningfully different from the
original. This type of generalized criticism ignores the fact that originality and
even copyright law itself are a means to an end. In Justice Stewart's terms, that
end is the "general public good." It makes little sense to protect efforts when that
protection may make the public worse off.
A related criticism also misses the point. It notes that Gracen essentially lost
her case because she succeeded in achieving her goal of creating a painting that
looked like the film and photographs of Dorothy.7 9 As the critic puts it, "[tihe
court condemned Gracen for achieving precisely her creative goal."8 As a more
general criticism, the author goes to reason that "[t]his claim that proof problems
justify a perverse definition of originality is unpersuasive."8' Finally, "the
copyright requirement of originality makes no sense because it claims variation as
a virtue, while authors of many objects ... rightly regard variations as a vice.'"82
Aside from the hyperbole of "condemnation," the interpretation is odd given
the context. Gracen entered a contest, won it by purposely avoiding being too
creative, and internalized a reward for her effort in the form of the prize money.
The standard announced was to be applied to derivative works only and only to
those in which a court could not find significant variation from the original. The
notion that "proof problems" are all that are involved in the court's decision
suggests an excessively narrow perspective of the policies to be balanced. The
logic offered by the author seems to favor extending copyright protection to what
already exists even if it is the result of an effort to avoid originality. Protection of
what is not original may be beneficial to individual authors but is inconsistent with
advancing social welfare.
In the abstract, one could adopt the view that a cost-benefit approach to
positive externalities is inappropriate and attribute lexical ordering to originality
in the sense that once it exists it is worth any cost.83 From this point of view,
even the most trivial originality would warrant even the most burdensome public
investment in the form of protection. This is not, however, a proposal that
anyone has taken seriously. Certainly, if Bat/n and Gracen involved judicial
assessment of aesthetic merit, there would be room for the concerns suggested
by their critics. Instead, what the opinions call for is an assessment of difference,
not quality, as a means of screening out derivative works that do not warrant their
relatively high potential costs of protection. The logic that works that are not
71 See Wiley, supra note 77, at 136-37.
8 Id.
8' Id. at 137.
82 Id.
83 Lexical ordering refers to the possibility that all value cannot ultimately be reduced to the
same standards of comparison like utility or dollars.
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much different from originals probably do not warrant protection seems sound.
The positive externalities are likely to be slight, and the process of protecting
these works can be administratively expensive.
V. THE SECOND ISSUE: NO MORE COSTLY THAN NECESSARY
As a fundamental matter, general copyright standards for delineating areas of
liability and no liability are in line with economic efficiency. This is the first step.
The second step is to protect those expressions that fall into the protected area
at the lowest cost. Here, as will be seen, the results are quite different from the
more general questions. Having decided what types of works should be
protected, copyright law shows only limited sensitivity to minimizing the costs of
that protection.
In theory, the way to achieve the lowest-cost positive externality would be
assess each work separately and then adjust the scope of protection necessary to
bring forth the work but do no more. 4 Each work would be protected by a
combination of duration, infringement standards, and remedies that result in
minimizing the social cost. This is probably impossible in reality. In addition, the
expense of what would amount to a very sophisticated examination of each work
and a determination of the payout necessary to make the artist's creative effort
worthwhile would be excessive. Even if it were not excessive, it still might be bad
policy. People who are creative may find themselves in a pooling-type
arrangement in which the profitability of a few works fund an ongoing effort at
experimentation with various forms and expressions of creativity.
Nevertheless, it appears that there are sensible ways to lower the costs to
society of bringing forth creative works without discouraging those who are
creative. Unfortunately, some decisions seem designed to increase the cost of the
copyright system rather than reduce it and offer no hope of actually increasing
creative efforts. Three areas of copyright law have great potential for rationalizing
the system: copyright terms, the reaction to new technologies, and "fair use." As
already noted, the record of copyright here is mixed as far as its economic
sensibility.
8 The economic model for such an exercise would be similar to perfect price discrimination.
Under perfect price discrimination, buyers pay exactly the maximum amount they are willing to pay
for goods and services. This eliminates consumer surplus. In the context of suppliers of creative
works, the goal would be to allow the internalization of benefits at the minimum level.
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A. COPYRIGHT DURATION
In terms of maximizing net social benefit from the regime of copyright,
nothing is as far off as copyright duration and the current standard of life plus
seventy years.8 5 The reason is pretty clear-cut. First, as Justice Breyer notes in
Eldred v. Ashcroft, only about 2% of copyrighted works have commercial value
fifty-five to seventy-five years after they are created. 6 Furthermore, whatever
future commercial value a work may have must be discounted to present value.
Thus, as Justice Breyer points out in response to the twenty-year extension to the
copyright term included as part of the Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA),
"[n]o potential author can reasonably believe that he has more than a tiny chance
of writing a classic that will survive commercially long enough for the copyright
extension to matter."'87 In effect, since there can be little incentive effect of
extended copyright terms, there is little reason to burden the public with whatever
additional costs the term gives rise to. Again, per Justice Breyer, one cost will
come in the form of the need to acquire "permissions," often by those who do
not profit from the use of the material but want to make it accessible to others."8
Another likely cost is the result of disputes among those who had no part in the
creation of a work over the profits from that work many years after it was created.
As much as these criticisms expose the economic irrationality of extended
copyright terms, they may actually understate the problem. For copyright
duration to play a role in an economically efficient level of internalization, two
factors are critical. First, the term would have to be set at the sufficient length
just to allow the minimum necessary level of internalization. This is obviously not
the case since copyright terms are unrelated to the social value of the work.
Second, if the term is not varied on the basis of economic factors, then it would
make sense for it to be fixed so that each author could make decisions about
investments in creative efforts on the basis of a certain period of protection. In
fact, copyright terms are not the same but vary with the age and health of the
artist. The existing term of life plus seventy years would only make sense if one
were convinced that relatively young and healthy authors were far more likely to
produce works that resulted in positive externalities than older ones or less
healthy ones. There is, obviously, no evidence that this is true.
1s 17 U.S.C. 5 302 (2000).
16 537 U.S. 186, 248, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225, 1256 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice
Breyer's source is E. RAPPAPORT, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, COPYRIGHT TERM EXTENSION:
ESTIMATING ECONOMIC VALUES (1998).
17 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 254 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
'8 Id. at 250.
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The most bizarre disconnect between economic rationality and copyright is the
retroactive extension of copyright terms. Works that are in existence can hardly
be subject to further incentives. Any additional gains are windfalls and any costs
to the public unnecessary. The Supreme Court had an opportunity to address this
disconnect and bring a modicum of rationality to duration in Eldred v. Ashcrof.9
The Court addressed several attacks on the twenty-year extension included in the
CTEA. Three of them go to the economic issue and are ultimately quite similar. 0
One argument was that application to existing works violates the requirement that
works contain some element of originality. A second was that an extension for
an existing work cannot "promote the Progress of Science." Finally, the
extension ignores the fact that an author must provide a quid pro quo for
copyright protection. All of these arguments stem from the reasoning that an
implied contract is struck between the State and the author, a position the Court
concedes is true. According to the Court, what is contained in that exchange for
the author is an understanding that he or she will receive whatever the current
copyright term is plus any extensions that may be enacted while the work is
protected. Consequently,
[gliven the consistent placement of existing copyright holders in
parity with future holders, the author of a work created in the last
170 years would reasonably comprehend.., a copyright not only
for the time in place when protection is gained, but also for any
renewal or extension legislated during that time."
Curiously, the Court cites in support of this proposition various licensing
agreements in which copyright holders grant rights to licensees for existing terms
and any possible extensions.92
This reasoning here is a self-conscious reach by the Court.93 Even as a
"reach," however, the reasoning fails. As already suggested, the notion that
authors are motivated by unknowable extensions that would attach to works with
a slim probability of having commercial value-highly discounted when the
extension attaches-is remote. Far more importantly, the motivation the Court
attributes to Congress is inconsistent with other terms of the CTEA and other
extensions. For example, the Copyright Act of 1976 effectively extended the
89 Id. at 186 (majority opinion).
90 Id. at 210.
91 Id. at 214-15 (footnote omitted).
92 Id. at 215 n.21.
9' The Court's reasoning here is put in terms of what Congress "could rationally seek" by
making the extension retroactive. Id. at 215.
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copyright term.94 At the same time, it permits the copyright holder or his or her
heirs to reclaim from those to whom rights have been transferred the period of
the extension.9 5 In other words, broad language in a license or assignment
granting the licensee or assignee rights for the copyright term and any extensions
are terminable.96 In fact, according to the Act, "[t]ermination of the grant may be
effected notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary, including an agreement
to make a will or to make any future grant."97 The same provision applies to the
addition of the twenty-year extension provided by the CTEA.98 The reason for
allowing the termination of these extensions can only be based on the belief that
the copyright holder did not understand himself or herself to be granting a yet-to-
be-enacted extension even though the granting instrument refers directly to
extensions.
The inconsistency of the Court's reasoning with the Act is fairly blatant. On
the one hand, the Court envisions Congress as having retroactively extended
copyright terms as a way of complying with authors' expectations. If these were,
in fact, the expectations of authors, it would also be their expectation that any
grant of existing copyright terms and extensions would apply to retroactive
extensions, and they would be compensated for the expected value of the yet-to-
exist extension. Instead, the Act treats the extensions as something the author
would not have anticipated by virtue of disallowing any grant language to be
interpreted to include a retroactive extension.
What is perhaps even more perverse from the standpoint of internalizing
positive externalities is the position of an author following the combination of the
Court's reasoning and the Copyright Act. If an author currently writes and is
motivated by the knowledge that he or she will be the beneficiary of retroactive
term extensions, he or she would also have to believe that those extensions are
not worth anything at this time because licensees are likely to pay very little for
rights that are likely to be terminable at the will not only of the author, but also
at the will of his or her heirs. In fact, while the Court seems to see the author as
a calculating profit-maximizer, Congress seems to view authors as irresponsible
people who must be protected from themselves.
Obviously, an effort to tailor copyright terms to fit different levels of
protection depending upon the level of positive externalities would itself give rise
to social costs. It might be possible to create a tiered system in which works
" The 1976 Act changed the copyright term from two twenty-eight year terms (if properly
renewed) to life plus fifty years. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2003).
95 17 U.S.C. 5 304(c) (2003).
96 See general# Paul Goldstein, Termination of Transfers and Licenses Under the New Copynght Act:
Thorny Problems for the Copyright Bar, 24 UCLA L. REv. 1107 (1977).
97 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(5) (2003).
98 17 U.S.C. § 304(d) (2003).
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qualify for different levels of protection depending on the relative values of the
work and the difficulty authors may encounter in their efforts to internalize. This
may seem troublesome because it asks courts to assess the relative value of
different works, but the danger is probably less than it appears. First, particularly
in the context of fair use analyses, courts routinely decide whether works are
"transformative," 99 whether the work "adds something new,'° or what works lie
"closer to the core of intended copyright protection than others."' O' Second, the
focus from an economic perspective is not solely on the value of the work, but
also on the barriers to internalization. In effect, the analysis required is probably
no more complex than some that take place already in copyright or that take place
when courts make decisions about, for example, the "rule of reason" in antitrust
or "proximate cause" in torts. Still, it is costly and poses dangers of allowing
judicial tastes to be too influential.
In general, it appears that copyright duration as expressed in the Copyright Act
and as interpreted by the Supreme Court cannot be reconciled with a rational
approach to positive externalities. In fact, it is not clear that term duration is
connected to any economic goals related to the production of creative efforts.
Instead, the driving force seems to be the never-ending battle over distributive
outcomes. Social costs would likely be lowered without any significant impact on
levels of creative effort by shortening the copyright term, creating a bright-line
copyright term that does not vary with the lifespan of the author, and an express
indication that future extensions, if any, are not to be applied retroactively.
B. NEW USES
1. The Theory. Although it may not seem so at first impression, closely related
to copyright duration is the question of how a copyright is affected by new uses
or technologies; both matters concern extensions. This was essentially the
situation in White-Smith Music°2 as it has been in more recent cases ranging from
Sony' Corp. of America v. Universal Studios, Inc.'°3 to New York Times Co. v Tasini.1°4
The issue in the context of new technologies can be framed in a variety of ways
including whether the new use actually involves copying or whether, as in Tasini,
the use was beyond that for which a license had been granted. At bottom, the
issue is whether an existing copyright extends to the use of an existing work in a
" Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1961, 1965
(1994).
100 Id. (citations omitted).
101 Id. at 586.
102 See text accompanying notes 111-12, infra.
103 464 U.S. 417, 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 665 (1984).
104 533 U.S. 483, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (2001).
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new medium. Superficially, the answer seems to be "yes" because the underlying
expression, regardless of the new medium, remains the same. This outcome may
not be the most economically beneficial, and the development of a new medium
presents an opportunity to apply a functional approach to the question in order
to reconcile copyright with maximizing social welfare.
The question, as already noted, is whether the approaches taken by courts to
new uses are consistent with minimizing the costs of works that are determined
to be "copyright-worthy." From an economic perspective as it relates to positive
externalities, the question could be posed in terms of the reasonable expectations
of the author at the time the work was created compared to the expected costs of
protecting those expectations. In fact, this view is easily squared with the
Supreme Court's own analysis in both Eldred v. Ashcrof 0 5 and MaZer v. Stein.'°6
The idea is that a contract exists between the author and the State and that the
author enters into that contract with a set of legitimate expectations that are the
motivating factors. It is useful from this perspective to draw from the logic of
conventional contract law used to address issues of excused performance, special
damages, and contractual interpretation. First, in the context of excuse for non-
performance, the issue is whether the party seeking to be excused assumed the
risk of the event affecting performance."°7 The idea is also found in the contract
rule that a breaching party must pay special damages that are foreseeable.'0 8 A
finding that any type of damage was foreseeable is actually a finding that the
breaching party assumed the risk of that type of damage. On the positive
externality side, the issue would be whether the gains from a new use were
reasonably foreseeable. If so, the author can be said to have "assumed the risk"
of the gain. Finally, if one views copyright as a contract with the State, contract
doctrine governing the "intent" of the parties is often analyzed from the
standpoint of foreseeability. 1°9
The issue of new uses is related to term extensions and even retroactive
extension in that an event occurs that may increase the value of the work. In
effect, just like an unanticipated term extension, a technological advance can result
in a "use extension." If the event leading to greater use of the copyright holder's
work is not reasonably foreseeable, it makes little economic sense to allow the
10s 537 U.S. 186, 214-15, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225, 1238 (2003). See supra text accompanying
notes 89-100.
106 347 U.S. 201, 219, 100 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 325, 333 (1954). See supra note 4.
107 See ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 599-642 (4th ed. 2004) (stating the standards that
determine whether a contracting party has assumed the risk of events making performance more
difficult).
118 Id. at 792-95.
109 Sidney A. Rosenzweig, Don't Put Mj Artickle Online: Extending Copyright's New-Use Doctine to
the Electronic Pubkshing Media and Beyond, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 899 (1995).
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copyright holder to benefit from the technological advance by finding that his or
her copyright extends to that use. These types of events are unlikely to have
played any role in the creative efforts of the author and would be a windfall to the
author"' while increasing all three forms of social costs.
The counter-argument would be analogous to that used by the Supreme Court
in Eldred in the context of term extensions. That argument would be that the
contract between the author and the State includes all possible use extensions
because throughout history authors have been granted rights to these extensions.
Unlike term extensions, this has not been the case. Not only have rights not been
extended to every new use, a policy that authors are protected from these uses
cannot be administered in a way that results in certainty. Unlike term extensions
that either exist or do not exist, whether a new use amounts to an infringement
is often a difficult interpretive question. In effect, the argument that the State has
already promised all authors that they will be broadly protected from all new uses
is not persuasive."'
This background means it is possible to see White-Smith Music from a new
perspective: one that emphasizes the nature of the bargain authors view
themselves as having entered into with the State. In the sense of following
through on the bargain struck with the composers of the original song, the issue
would be whether they could reasonably foresee the development of piano rolls.
If they did, did they have a reasonable expectation that their works could not be
"reproduced" without their permission? These questions are not just important
in the context of assuring that the composers in White-Smith Music are given their
expectancy under the bargain struck with the State, but that the expectations of
future authors are shaped to encourage efficient conduct. Furthermore,
"foreseeability" should not be taken literally. It is, as it generally is in law, a
concept to describe a risk allocation decision, and it seems to turn on the
probability of an event occurring.
In theory it makes sense to draw a line. A more practical question is whether
a line can be drawn that makes economic sense without doing unacceptable
damage to predictability and incentives. Two guidelines are important in this
regard. First, everything else being equal, it makes sense to allocate the risk of
unforeseen events-including those leading to gains-to authors. The role of the
State is essentially passive without any direct capacity to effect the nature of
works produced or the direction value-increasing or value-decreasing
technological changes may take. Second, the issue is ultimately economic and
"' See, e.g., Cohen v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 845 F.2d 851, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1723, 1725
(9th Cir. 1988); Harper Bros. v. Klaw, 232 F. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1916).
' And, even if copyright law has been interpreted to give rise to this expectation, itis likely that
the policy creating that expectation is inefficient.
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should focus on the impact of the change on the market for the work. It is, after
all, market reactions that ultimately determine the levels of internalization and
motivation.
It is essential, therefore, to think in terms of the various forms of market
impact. First, the new technology and medium can make the work available to
those who would not otherwise use the work. For example, in White-Smith Music,
some purchases of piano rolls would be market-expanding since those making
purchases would under no circumstances have purchased sheet music. Second,
the new technology and medium may have a substitution effect. Again in White-
Smith Music, people who listen to music may buy piano rolls instead of engaging
live musicians who buy sheet music. Finally, the new technology may have both
these effects. For example, purchases of the piano rolls that produce the sounds
of existing tunes may mean lost sheet music sales but increased exposure of the
original material as people who would not have otherwise purchased the music
now acquire it in a different form." 2 Each of these possibilities needs to be
considered.
a. Market Expansions. The easier eventuality to address is one that results
in market expansion. In general, the better policy is one that denies to authors the
income from unforeseeable eventualities that have market-expanding effects. Any
income derived will be in the nature of a windfall, and it makes little economic
sense for the public to shoulder the costs of preserving this windfall for authors.
The logic of this is seen more clearly by considering the complementary rule:
When the event resulting in market expansion is relatively foreseeable, the
reasonable assumption is that authors were and will be motivated by these income
streams." 3 The income can hardly be regarded as a windfall. This would not
necessarily mean that these authors should be protected-since the social costs
of doing so may exceed the benefits, but the presumption is that these gains are
part of the author's incentives. 4
These rules also have intuitive appeal. For example, what author creates in the
hopes of internalizing the gains from an unanticipated market expansion? It
112 Granted, to some extent this division is artificial in that it begs the issue of impact. For
example, if the author's rights include all possible uses of his or her work, then a market "expansion"
is not that at all but simply the manifestation of what was always anticipated. Similarly, a new
technology that results in substitution is not a substitution if it was never part of the author's
calculus. For this reason, it is important to focus strictly on the market impacts. In the first instance,
are people given access who would not have otherwise had access? In the second, are there people
who would have purchased the first medium but for the technological advance?
13 The idea may also be understood by asking whether it makes economic sense to encourage
creative efforts, the success of which depends on unknown technological changes.
14 To be sure, there is some flexibility in copyright, especially with regard to "fair use," that can
be used to "correct" for economic considerations even in these instances.
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seems an unlikely occurrence, but even if it does occur, it is not clear this is the
type of speculation that should be encouraged. It is important to keep in mind
that the existence of market expansion gains and the fierce legal battles over the
rights to those gains does not mean that authors were motivated by those gains.
A decision to file an action today is made on the basis of a comparison between
expected future costs and benefits without regard for the origins of those gains.
That in itself is an expensive and unproductive exercise since that battle creates
no wealth."'
Perhaps the prudent course is to view the likelihood that authors create in
hopes of internalizing income from low probability market-expanding events as
involving an empirical question. This hardly seems necessary. Specifically, what
are the social benefits derived from creative efforts that would not take place but
for a belief by the author that he or she will derive income from very low
probability events that will make the work available to a larger market? On the
other side of the scale are the social costs of excluding others from using these
works should they come into existence, plus the use of the copyright apparatus
to divide the income derived from the work, including some that was not relevant
at the time of creation."
6
With respect to the first half of this comparison, there are a number of reasons
why the social benefits that are dependent on low probability market-expanding
events are likely to be small and, therefore, unlikely to make much of a difference
at the margin. The obvious first one is that possible income must be multiplied
by the probability that it will develop in order to derive an expected value. In
addition, given the low probability or foreseeability, it is likely that these events
are to take place years down the road, which means that the income must be
heavily discounted. The likelihood for it to play any role seems even more remote
when one considers the evidence that in some contexts people are often not very
115 More technically, this is a battle over the distribution of existing wealth. It does not create
new wealth.
116 One possible addition to the list of costs is associated with the role denying access to the new
use will play as an entry barrier to the new technology. It is probably not intellectual property or
copyright law per se that gives rise to this cost. Even with copyright protection, many works cannot
be sold for more than a competitive price because the works themselves are not associated with
market power. If the inability to pay at least a competitive price for an input is the difference
between entering and not entering, there is unlikely to be much in the way of social cost associated
with the lack of entry. On the other hand, in other instances copyright and the nature of the work
combine to create market power, and the owner can charge a supracompetitive profit. In other
words, the author may have actually created something that is "special," and copyright prevents new
competitors from emerging to force the price down to competitive levels. The failure to enter a
market because sellers of inputs can demand supracompetitive prices does result in social costs. A
rule responsive to this problem would not be a copyright rule as it is one dealing with the treatment
of market power in all contexts.
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adept at comprehending uncertain events."' "Prospect theory ' teaches us that
people value expected gains less than they value expected losses. In effect, the
possibility of winning a lottery is less a source of motivation than avoiding losing
what one has."9 It seems quite reasonable that an author would view increased
income from an unexpected market expansion as a gain, and the impact of
substitution away from his or her work as a loss. What this means is that the gain
will have less motivational importance than the actual expected values might
suggest. In general, all this adds up to a very simple proposition: that it is
unlikely that creative people like Walt Disney or Margaret Mitchell were
influenced at the time of their creative efforts by the riches of which we are now
conscious but they were ignorant. Almost certainly the social costs of addressing
these gains and of excluding others from using the works outweigh the marginal
impact on creativity.
b. Substitution Effects. The question of protection from media that result
in substitutions is more difficult, and tinkering with it can be risky. Substitutions
are different from expansions in that substitutions are more likely to be perceived
as losses rather than unexpected gains. We know, if only from the existence of
an insurance industry, that people are very sensitive to losses and there is a
motivational impact. To understand the complexity, think in terms of the author
who is on the edge of creating a new work and is sensitive to the market
implications. The possibility may exist that a new technology will make a
substitute medium available, but the author may create anyway because he or she
is relying on the copyright system for protection. In effect, copyright has an
insurance-like impact here. A reasonable belief that substitutions will not be
permitted is something copyright must deliver on or there will be a negative
impact on the author's incentive. It is, to be sure, tempting to think the author
who creates in the face of a new technology is assuming the risk, but that
assumption gobbles up copyright law completely. After all, a foreseeable new use
plays no different a role in the decisionmaking process than known substitution
possibilities, and it is the baseline job of copyright to determine what is an
infringement. The difficult question is when to protect the author from
substitutions and when not to.
First, what about the author who is more or less blind-sided by a new
technology that results in a medium that creates an opportunity for substitution
117 See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Propect Theory: An Anaysis of Decision Under Risk, 47
ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979); W. Kip Viscusi, Age Varation in Risk Perretion and Smoking Decisions,
73 REV. OF ECON. & STAT. 577-88 (1991).
118 Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 117.
119 "Prospect theory" compares gains and losses from the status quo. In this context, an author
is likely to view the positive effects of an unexpected market expansion as a gain and the impact of
substitution as a loss.
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and a loss of income? Here, the author could be said to assume the risk because
he or she creates in the context of conscious ignorance. From this point of view,
the author in 1920 would not be protected from photocopying because at the
time of creation, the author knows that he or she cannot know what technological
change lies ahead, but chooses to create anyway. Here though, the author in all
likelihood does not view himself or herself as taking much of a risk on the
reaction of copyright law itself to these unknowns. If anything, the insurance
function of copyright is more pronounced here.
Second, should today's authors be permitted to assume that they will be
protected from all future substituting eventualities? More specifically, should the
public generally be required to pay the "premium" on an insurance policy that
says "no matter what" no new technology will be used to displace your work?
Although there are dangers that this insurance may be too expensive, it is also
virtually impossible to develop a rule for all cases in this category. Is this to say
authors should be protected from all substitution-creating technological changes?
Probably not. Protection, even in those cases, generates social costs and a
weighing should take place. If possible, this analysis should be done on a case-by-
case basis with the possibility of the emergence of rules for classes of cases. In
this analysis, the important factor is whether, in the future, events of the same
probability are unlikely to influence authors sufficiently to justify the costs of
exclusion and administration. To some, the idea that one would not protect
authors from works resulting from new technologies and which are substitutes
may seem inconsistent with copyright. This misses the point. The purpose of
copyright is to protect to the extent necessary. It also ignores the reality. In
various ways-most importantly "fair use"-it is clear that copyright does allow
substitutes to displace original works.
c. Expansion and Substitution Effects. The category of mixed causes is also
complex. For example, what we now know is that after White-Smith Music was
decided, the demand for sheet music declined while the demand for music in all
kinds of recorded forms exploded.20 Demand for sheet music for the
compositions involved in the case may have declined as buyers substituted away
from sheet music to a more convenient form of listening. To some extent, the
growth was simply the result of a superior medium. In fact, it seems very likely
that thousands of people listened to music as a result of the new medium, and the
compositions themselves were not primarily responsible for the increased
exposure of the compositions. In a sense, the "but for" cause was the
technological advance. In cases like this in which the dominant impact is
expansion, the better decision is to find that copyright is not infringed.
"2 See Trotter Hardy, Copyright and 'Nevew-Use" Technologies, 23 NOVA L. REV. 659, 677 (1999).
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d. A SuggestedApproach. The approach suggested here can be illustrated
with Venn diagrams, and a series of priorities can be created. In Figure 1,
foreseen and foreseeable are shown as separate from unforeseeable events. Those
universes then intersect with the universes of market-extending effects and
substitution effects. The shaded intersection represents those instances in which
an unforeseen event results in a market extension only. In these situations there
is no economic reason to protect the author of the original work. In effect, a per
se unprotected rule would be appropriate here."' The middle area is one in which
both substitution and extension effects are found; balancing these effects would
determine which rule to adopt.
FIGURE 1
Unforeseen events
Market extending
Substitution Foreseen and foreseeable
Substitution effects can also be foreseen and foreseeable or unforeseen. Here
too, no clear per se rules emerge. Narrow interpretations of what is protected
may undermine efficient incentives, and broad interpretation may unnecessarily
increase social costs. These issues should be considered on a case-by-case basis.
When the substitution is foreseen or foreseeable, in all likelihood the author
legitimately expected protection, and it probably makes sense to begin with the
presumption that the work is protected. On the other hand, when the
substitution is unforeseen, it may make sense to reverse that presumption.
12' As with all per se rules, these two will not be correct 100% of the time, but it is doubtful that
the cost of further refinements in these two categories can be justified by increases in social benefits.
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The analysis creates a range or continuum of protections ranging from least
to most protected as follows: 1
22
1. Unforeseen or unforeseeable market extension effects. [No
protection]
2. Mixed unforeseen market extension and substitution effects with
market extension dominant. [Very strong presumption of no
protection]
3. Mixed unforeseen market extension and substitution effects with
substitution dominant. [Strong presumption of no protection]
4. Unforeseen substitution effects. [Presumption of no protection]
5. Foreseen substitution effect. [Presumption of protection]
6. Mixed foreseen substitution and market extension with
substitution dominant. [Strong presumption of protection]
7. Mixed foreseen substitution and market extension with market
extension dominant. [Very strong presumption of protection]
8. Foreseen market extension. [Fully protected]
2. The Cases. Especially in recent years, the issues raised by new technologies
have dominated copyright law and have frequently been addressed by copyright
scholars. Typically the issue arises in one of two contexts. One involves the use
of a new technology and a claim of infringement by the author. This issue can be
seen as whether the initial copyright's exclusivity extended to the new use. A
decision that it does not means the new user is not infringing. The more
common cases are instances in which a grant has been made and the
grantor/licensor claims the grant did not extend to the new use.'23 Here the issue
is one of contract interpretation with the focus on what the parties intended.'24
In these instances, it is not clear that a decision one way or the other has any
clearly predictable social consequences. On the other hand, the reasoning
involved may be instructive as to whether a more general rule of denying rights
to unforeseen extension has evolved.
"2 There are also combined effects not illustrated here. The most extreme would be unforeseen
expansion combined with foreseen substitution. The combination would have to involve two
simutaneously emerging technologies-one foreseen, one not. Although possible, this seems
unlikely and is not discussed here.
123 See generally Hardy, supra note 120.
124 See, e.g., Bartsch v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 391 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1968). See general#
Joshua A. Tepfer, The Poiy Considerations of New Use Copyright Law as it Pertains to Ebooks, 4 MINN.
INTELL. PROP. REv. 393 (2003); Rosenzweig, supra note 109.
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In the first group of cases, it makes sense to return to White-Smith Music.'25
There, it will be recalled, composers did not claim that manufacturers of piano
roles had gone beyond the limits of any licenses. Instead, the manufacturers
argued that mechanical reproduction was not an interest reserved for the
copyright holders in the first place. The Court held for the manufacturers with
reasoning that reveals little in the way of economic logic. Instead, the rationale
seems to be that one could not look at a piano roll and read music from it.
How would a more economically-minded Court have decided the case? The
vast majority of the compositions under copyright at the time were likely to have
been written when piano rolls and other forms of mechanical devices for
reproducing music were unforeseen. Thus, both the substitution and market
extension effects would have been unforeseen with market extension being
dominant. The impact was to make music more accessible in the home. This
would put the work in the market-extension-dominating category. A very strong
presumption of no protection would follow. Certainly, new technology enabled
composers to have greater exposure, but the nature of the compositions had little
to do with what was a major shift in the market. In terms of positive externalities,
the declining fortunes of composers had far less to do with free-riding than it did
with simply being the victim of market shift. The decision meant the avoidance
of exclusion and administrative costs that would have followed had recording
companies been forced to negotiate for the rights.
In theory, a better approach would have been to distinguish between those
compositions recently created and falling within a time period in which piano role
production might have been anticipated and those created earlier. This, however,
ignores the cost of repeated litigation focusing on the time of creation and the
likelihood of the new technology at the time of creation. When all factors are
balanced, the result of the case, if not the reasoning, can be reconciled with an
economic approach to positive externalities.
This all became moot, of course, in 1909 when Congress granted the rights to
composers and set up a compulsory licensing system for works already in
recorded form. One can only speculate about the pattern of events if this had not
occurred, and it is in this regard that the reasoning of the Court becomes critical.
Would the fact that compositions found only in sheet music form could be used
without payment have discouraged composing music so that today there would
be less original music available? Under the formalistic approach employed by the
Court, this seems possible.'26 Under the approach discussed here, however, each
12s A good discussion of the history of the case is found in Hardy, supra note 120, at 673-77.
126 But unlikely. In the absence of statutory change, what would have happened is not that
different from what did happen-sheet music would have become an obsolete method of
publication. This seems inevitable. Sheet music is best seen as raw material that is used to produce
[Vol. 13:1
2005] POSI77VE EXTERNALITIES TO COPYRIGHT LAW
composition would be assessed on the basis of what was foreseeable at the time
it was created. After a certain point, all compositions would be protected from
each new technology within a few years of that technology's inception.
The facts are similar in Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros.,'27 but the result is different in
that the new use was found to be an infringement. In 1911, Kalem produced a
motion picture of Ben Hur, a novel to which Harper held the dramatization
rights. In fact, in 1899, Harper contracted to have a play written and granted to
a third party the rights to produce and perform the dramatization.' 2  Kalem
claimed a motion picture did not fall within the rights held by Harper. Harper
sued, claiming the motion picture was an infringement, and the Supreme Court
agreed. 129 At the time the book was written and published, it is not likely that the
author or publisher was motivated by the possibility of a film production of Ben
Hur 30  Motion pictures did exist in 1899 when Harper, with the author's
permission, granted the dramatization rights, but it is unlikely that an extravagant
film production of a book was foreseeable.'31 The contract granting
dramatization rights limited those rights to "producing on the stage" and to a
single approved script.132 If one views film production as involving an unforeseen
substitution, it appears hard to square with the outcome of the guidelines
suggesting that a mild presumption of no protection would be appropriate. The
the sounds. The sheet music itself has no value other than serving as a means to this end. And, at
least until 1978 when fixation, as opposed to publication, became the act that leads to protection,
composers would have published music in a performance medium. This may seem costly, but it is
important to remember that the dominance of publication in a performance medium was an event
that occurred independently of copyright. In effect, the 1908 decision had the potential to reduce
copyright costs of all kinds without lowering incentives or increasing administrative costs.
127 222 U.S. 55 (1911).
"' Harper found itself at odds with the party-Klaw-to whom it had transferred the exclusive
rights to produce and perform a dramatic version of Ben Hur. Klaw also wanted to produce a
motion picture and Harper claimed successfully that the rights transferred did not extend to that use.
Harper Bros. v. Klaw, 232 F. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1916).
"' The reasoning is markedly different from that found in White-Smith Music in that the Court
noted the issue was one of methods of presenting the story and that changing the mechanical
process did not alter the substance of seeing the "story lived." Kakm, 222 U.S. at 61.
130 id
131 The issue of foreseeability is debatable. For example, in the subsequent case of HarperBmtbers
v. Klaw, the court explained that '"There were moving pictures, but it was then completely beyond
the known possibilities of the art to produce a series of pictures representing such and so spectacular
and elaborate a play or performance as is the Ben Hur of Klaw & Erlanger." 232 F. at 611. That
opinion also goes on to treat the revenues from the motion picture as a windfall. Thus, "they are
an accretion or unearned increment conferred of late years upon the copyright owners by the
ingenuity of many inventors and mechanisms." Id. at 613.
132 Id at 610.
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result is an increase in the social costs of the copyright above the minimum
necessary.
On the other hand, the decision also can be understood as an effort to avoid
a competitive imbalance. Stage and motion picture productions were substitute
media at the time. A decision that dramatization rights did not extend to motion
pictures would mean that those who produced plays would have to pay for the
rights while those who made motion pictures would not. In the case, Harper
would have paid for the rights to dramatize Ben Hur as a play while the motion
picture producers would have acquired the story for free. Thus, while finding that
the copyright did not prevent the production of the motion picture is attractive
from the point of view of lowering exclusion and administrative costs, there are
offsetting costs. It would have amounted to a decision that one producer was
required to pay for an input while a competitor was not required to pay for the
same input. The outcome would have been a flow of resources into the
production of films that was unrelated to the attractiveness of films relative to
plays.
Thus, although the case seems inconsistent with White-Smith Muic, there is an
important distinguishing factor. Sheet music is always, or nearly always, a means
to an end of creating actual sounds. A novel, its stage adaptation, and a motion
picture are all final products and in many cases compete with each other. In
White-Smith Music, the Court was not faced with deciding between likely
competitors for the format in which the final product was to be presented. In
Kalem v. HarperBrothers, the decision was between competitors. Thus, the decision
seems more influenced by a concern for competitive balance rather than authors'
incentives.The new technology issue in Fortnighty Corp. v. United Arists Teevision, Inc.,' 3 3
was in the context of a group of community antenna television systems. The
systems "picked up" signals from broadcast stations and transmitted those
broadcasts to individual homes. The issue was whether receiving and carrying
the broadcast signals to homes amounted to a performance in violation of the
copyrights to motion pictures that were broadcast and then retransmitted over the
cable system. As an economic matter, the copyright owner was attempting to
internalize the benefits of this rebroadcast. The Supreme Court held that it was
not a performance and made a distinction between the act of exhibition
(performance), which it said broadcasters perform, and viewers, who are passive
beneficiaries. 34 The Court held that the cable system was comparable to viewers
who had taken steps to enhance their ability to receive the broadcasters' signals.'
35
133 392 U.S. 390, 158 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1 (1968).
134 Id. at 398.
131 Id. at 399. In so doing, the Court distinguished and narrowed Buck v.Jewell-La Salle Realo Co.,
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The majority opinion reveals little in the way of economic reasoning aside from
an initial observation that "the Copyright Act does not give a copyright holder
control over all uses of his copyrighted work.', 136 In terms of a positive externality
analysis and the framework explained earlier, the case appears to involve an
unforeseen market extension in that new viewers of televised broadcasts were
brought into the system. 137 Thus, the outcome is consistent with the classification
described above.
Interestingly, a facially more economic orientation is found injustice Fortas'
dissenting opinion. According to Justice Fortas, the cable companies were using
the property of others and the question for the court was whether "the owner of
the copyrighted material should be compensated."' 38 He notes that the decision
is critical for cable television and broadcasting and that "it would be hazardous
to assume Congress will act promptly.' '139 Having created the predicate for a
functional approach, he then takes a different path; he asserts that the majority
has erred by straying from a relatively bright-line definition of performance in
order to foster the growth of cable television. He concludes that "the task of
caring for CATV is one for the Congress."' ° In effect, the opinion shows a
knowledge of the economic approach but an unwillingness to employ it. The
majority opinion, on the other hand, announces an economically sensible
outcome but reveals no express economic reasoning.
A case that brims with economic reasoning in the new use context is Sony Corp.
ofAmerica v. Universal Studios, Inc.," in which the Supreme Court considered the
liability of manufacturers of home videotape recorders. The Court held that the
manufacturers were not contributory infringers even though purchasers of the
machines were known by manufacturers to use them to reproduce copyrighted
material. 42 The analytical framework was set by the Court's early observation that
the plaintiffs in the case "can exploit their rights [in their works] in a number of
283 U.S. 191 (1931), in which it held that a hotel owner who had wired the rooms in order to carry
radio broadcasts to each room had infringed the copyrights of those who had composed and
preformed the music. Curiously, the Court also noted that the cable operators did not perform the
copyrighted works "in any conventional sense of that term." Fortnight, 392 U.S. at 395. It then
cites White-Smith Muic with a cf. signal. Id. at 395 n.14.
Id. at 393 (footnote deleted).
3 This would probably be true at the time, but we now know that there are substitution effects,
and viewers within broadcast range also rely on cable. The issues of free-riding and infringement
were treated by the 1976 Copyright Act, section 111 of which provides for compulsory licensing.
138 Id. at 403 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
139 Id.
'40 Id. at 408.
1 464 U.S. 417, 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 665 (1984).
142 Id. The Court was influenced by the fact that the two plaintiffs involved-Universal Studios
and Walt Disney Productions were not representing a larger class of copyright holders. Id. at 434.
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ways: by authorizing theatrical exhibitions, by licensing limited showing on cable
and network television, by selling syndication rights for repeated airings on local
television stations, and by marketing programs on prerecorded videotapes or
videodiscs."' 4 3 The Court also adopted as a starting point the view that the Court
should be reluctant to expand copyright protection to new technology.'" It is
hard not to infer that the Court was suggesting, in effect, that "enough is
enough," and at some point the copyright holder is overreaching. Clearly, the
case was framed as an unforeseen market extension.
In holding that the manufacturers were not liable, the Court adopted a
standard from patent law applied to "articles of commerce." The question is
whether the article is capable of "commercially significant noninfringing uses."'
45
The Court noted the compelling evidence that the principal use of the machines
was time-shifting and that a great number of copyright holders affected did not
object to the copying. In fact, for many it meant greater exposure of their
works."4 According to the Court, "to the extent time-shifting expands public
access to freely broadcast television programs, it yields societal benefits.' 47 In
considering the works of those who did object, the Court found that there was
very little indication that they were harmed by time-shifting.
Ultimately, the Court refused to place the interests of the copyright holders
involved over those of non-objecting copyright holders, for whom the machines
were beneficial, and the manufacturers. Its reasoning seems to fit a systematic
approach to positive externalities. In particular, when adopting the view that the
Court should be wary of expanding the scope of protection to new technologies,
it cites Wbite-Smith Musi 48 and notes the need to avoid protecting authors more
than necessary to benefit the public more generally.
49
As already noted, the issue of new technologies also arises in the context of
disputes about the scope of a license when a method to exploit that license is
developed that the parties did not expressly allow for. One possible reaction to
these instances would be for a court to find that the use at issue was not granted
because it was not within the scope of copyright protection in the first place. This
would leave the licensee and anyone else free to exploit the work in that new use.
This is not the track these cases have generally taken. Instead, they are governed
by standard contract gap-filling rules.' ° For example, in Bartsch v. Metro-Goldwyn-
143 Id. at 421-22.
144 Id. at 431.
145 Id at 442.
'46 Id at 454.
147 Id.
148 Id. at 432 n.13.
149 Id. at 432-33.
"' For a discussion, see Tepfer, supra note 124; Rosenzweig, supra note 109.
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Mayer, Inc.," 1 the issue was whether a grant of the motion picture rights to a work
included the right to authorize broadcast of the motion picture on television. At
the time of the assignment, television did exist but was in its very early stages."5 2
The assignment included the right to "project, transmit and otherwise reproduce
the . .. work or any adaptation . .. thereof, visually or audibly by the art of
cinematography or any process analogous thereto.'' s The assignor was Warner
Brothers, which had received an assignment from Bartsch, who acquired the
motion picture rights in 1930. Bartsch claimed that the language of the grant and
further language that "[a]U other rights now in existence or which may hereafter
come into existence shall always be reserved to the [o]wner" meant that the right
to televise had not been included in the 1930 grant and, thus, could not be
transferred.'54
The court, relying on a 1964 edition of Professor Melvin Nimmer's copyright
treatise,55 opted for a broad interpretation of the rights granted. It held that the
license did include the rights to authorize television broadcast. In terms of
narrowing the copyright itself as a means of maximizing social welfare, the case
is not of interest. There seemed to be no question that the television rights did
exist at the time of the grant. 5 6 The only issue was who owned them. Even here,
however, the reasoning bears some relation to the classification described above.
In finding that the grant had been made, the court noted that in 1930 the
possibility of television was well known.'57 This would put the right in the
category of a foreseeable market extension and presumptively part of the scope
of rights that the grantor would assign by the use of general language.
The reasoning of the court does, however, reveal some additional economic
sophistication and sensitivity to the fact that a proper solution to a private
contract matter may affect the public more generally.' 8 Thus, "favoring the
1 391 F.2d 150, 157 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 65 (2d Cit. 1968).
152 Id. at 154.
153 Id. at 151.
154 Id at 152. Bartsch's reasoning actually had an additional component. When Bartsch
transferred the motion picture rights, these were the only rights he possessed. After the assignment
of those rights-first to Warner Brothers and then to MGM-he obtained the rest of the copyright.
Thus, he had not transferred the television rights but still had them by virtue of receiving the
remainder of copyrights. Id. at 152-53.
15 Id. at 155 (citing MELVIN NIMMER, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT 125.3 (1964)).
156 If the work-in the form of a play-had been created in 1930 rather than being transferred,
one might treat the case as falling in the foreseeable substitution and protect the televison rights for
the author against use by someone attempting to televise the play without permission.
157 Bartsch, 391 F.2d at 154. The court distinguished Kirke La Shelk Co. v. PaulArmstrong Co., 188
N.E. 163 (1938), a case it classified as dealing with a new use that was completely unknown at the
time of contracting.
158 The court's principal reasoning is that the risk of inexact language was to be born by the
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broader view in a case like this is that it provides a single person who can make
the copyrighted work available to the public over the penumbral medium, whereas
the narrower one involves the risk that a deadlock between the grantor and
grantee might prevent the work's being shown over the new medium at all." 15 9
Although the likelihood of a deadlock preventing televising of the film is low, the
court seems to suggest that the costs (transaction costs in this case) of its finding
its way to the television screen is decreased by the broader interpretation of the
grant.
Taking the new use chronologically one more step is Cohen v. Paramount Pictures
Coop. '6 At issue was a musical composition, the rights to which were transferred
for use in a film and on television. When the holder of those rights made copies
of the film (and music) on videotape, the owner of the copyright to the
composition claimed it was an infringement. The court held that videotape use
was not within the scope of the contract even though the video would be viewed
on television sets. The critical phrase in the grant was "exhibition by means of
television," which the court said could not include videocassettes since they had
not been invented at the time of the contract. Of course, they also had not been
invented and were evidently unforeseeable at the time the music was composed.
Thus, the court was faced more or less with a windfall either for the copyright
holder or the licensee. According to the court, the licensee should not" 'reap the
windfall' associated with the new medium." '161 The court also reasoned that the
contract language reserving "all rights and uses in and to said musical
composition, except those herein granted to the licensee" meant that unknown
videocassette rights could not have been granted.'62 This is not an unreasonable
approach, but the court stumbles badly when seeking policy support for its
holding. It goes on to assert that the Copyright Act was "enacted for the benefit
of the composer. '  The case appears to be one of an unforeseen market
extension since the use of the song in a videotape of a film that the composition
was not written for in the first place is sufficiently remote to have had no impact
on the incentive to create. Moreover, it is not clear that a decision favoring the
filmmaker would have any great impact on future composers. As long as one
adheres to the foreseeability guideline, current and future composers will be
unaffected by decisions as they relate to particular new uses. Again, however, in
grantor. Bartsch, 391 F.2d at 155.
159 Id
160 845 F.2d 851, 7 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1570 (9th Cit. 1988).
161 Id. at 854 (quoting Comment, Past Copyright Licenses and the New Video Software Medium, 29
UCLA L. REv. 1160, 1184 (1982)).
162 Id
163 Id. at 855 (quotingJondora Music Pub'g Co. v. Melody Recordings, Inc., 506 F.2d 392, 395,
184 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 326, 328 (3d Cit. 1974)).
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a case like this and other contract cases, it is not clear there is much of an impact
on social welfare. Ultimately, the issue is not between the author and free access
but a conflict between two parties both of whom have an interest in exploiting the
work by limiting access of the public more generally.
A recent new technology case involving a contract dispute is New York Times
Co. v. Tasini.'" The issue was actually a rather narrow one. Freelance writers
licensed publications to print their articles as part of their newspapers and
magazines. These articles would appear in the print media among other articles.
The publishers then made the articles available in electronic and CD-Rom
databases that enabled researchers to "pull up" and read the articles
independently-not as part of the original publication. It was this reproduction
the authors objected to. The response of the publications was that they were
exercising their rights with respect to collective works. Under Section 201 (c) of
the 1976 Act:
In the absence of an express transfer of the copyright or of any
rights under it, the owner of copyright in the collective work is
presumed to have acquired only the privilege of reproducing and
distributing the contribution as part of that particular collective
work, any revision of that collective work, and any later collective
work in the same series. 65
In other words, they argued that including the articles as a part of databases was
merely a revision of the original collection.
The Court ruled for the authors, using exclusively a formalistic analysis similar
to White-Smith Music and focusing on what an article would look like when pulled
up from a database as opposed to being viewed in the context of the original
publication. 166 The dissenting opinion, authored by Justice Stevens, initially
applies the same form of analysis, initially describing how databases can be viewed
as revisions.167 After this discussion, however, the dissent begins to reveal an
approach more in keeping with a rational approach to positive externalities.
According to Justice Stevens, it is unlikely that the drafters of the 1976 Copyright
Act anticipated the use of electronic databases when considering section 201.
Accordingly, it was up to the Court to interpret that section in a way that was
consistent with copyright policy more generally. Quoting Melvin and David
Nimmer, Justice Stevens writes: "[t]he primary purpose of copyright is not to
14 533 U.S. 483, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (2001).
165 17 U.S.C. § 201(c) (2000).
166 Tasini, 533 U.S. at 501-04.
167 Id. at 511-18 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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reward the author, but is rather to secure 'the general benefits derived by the
public from the labors of authors.' ,'68 He argues that the majority decision
"subverts" that goal in favor of "authorial rights." '69 Justice Stevens, joined by
Justice Breyer, expresses a willingness to include in the balance the impact the
majority's interpretation will have on the access of the public to the articles.
Against this decrease in access, he notes that it is not clear that the authors gain
anything other than retrospective statutory damages.' In short, the dissent was
willing to take the economic route and concluded that the interpretation by the
majority simply increased costs to the public without increasing the incentive of
freelance authors.
The overall impression one has from the new use cases is that there is little to
connect their reasoning to the goal of minimizing social costs. There are
instances in which the decisions are consistent with that outcome, but this may
be more happenstance than anything else. Perhaps the economic rationality is a
bit more pronounced than in the case of copyright duration, but it would be
incorrect to claim that any meaningful trend has developed.
C. FAIR USE
A third method that has the capacity to adjust copyright to achieve the "no
more costly than necessary" goal is fair use. Fair use can lower social costs by
reducing unnecessary exclusivity and lowering transaction costs.' 7' In addition,
a clearly stated and understood policy can lower administrative costs. Fair use
differs from duration and new use jurisprudence in two ways. First, it has the
potential to be the scalpel of copyright law. It can be applied to particular uses
of particular works and, in many instances, will not create broad-based rules. In
effect, fair use rulings can be more contained in their implications than rulings
about duration or new uses. Of course, a poliy of liberal or conservative
applications of fair use generally can have the impact of a broad rule. Second, the
Copyright Act includes a fairly detailed description of when fair use is to be
applied, and the elements listed can easily be interpreted in a way that promotes
positive externalities at the lowest cost.'72
168 Id. at 519; 1 MELVIN NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, COPYRIGHT § 1.03[A] (2000) (quoting Fox
Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932)).
169 Tasini, 533 U.S. at 522.
170 Id. The dissent noted that the New York Times had started in 1995 requiring freelance
authors to agree to grant the Times "electronic rights." Id. at 522.
171 For a thorough analysis of fair use from an economic perspective, see Wendy Gordon, Fair
Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82
COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1982).
172 The four-pronged approach involves a weighing of factors. 17 U.S.C. § 105 (2000).
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The lowest-cost requirement here entails allowing others to use the
copyrighted works of authors as long as the internalized benefit remains
sufficiently high to provide the incentive to create. Again, the policy must be
forward-looking as well as backward-looking. A backward-looking perspective
alone will always counsel in favor of broad subsequent use because the work
already exists. On the other hand, the subsequent use must not be so broad that
it undermines authors of yet-to-be-produced works. Thus, in many respects the
application of fair use has some of the character of new use policy in that the goal
is not to violate the reasonable expectations of authors.
From an economic perspective, an important distinction can be made between
commercial and non-commercial uses. When the work for which fair use is
claimed is used in a context in which payment could not be made, most of the
costs of exclusivity are decreased by allowing the use without any substantial
impact on the incentives of authors.173 A fair use policy that consistently permits
non-commercial uses lowers the social costs of copyright law. This view
conforms to the statute itself. The first element of the four-part test focuses on
"the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes."' 74 "Purpose and
character" in this context refers to the Act's provision that uses for "criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching, . . . scholarship, or research [are] not an
infringement of copyright."'75  A non-commercial use is also likely to be
consistent with the fourth prong of the fair use analysis. The focus of that prong
is "the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work.'
17 6
A more difficult question is how to assess fair use when that use is
commercial. The problem is that, in the context of a commercial use, presumably
the work is an input no different from any other. In those contexts, the basic
theory is that the allocation should be determined by a private transaction and a
fair use not permitted. This moves the transaction costs to private parties and
insures that the work is allocated efficiently. Still, there are at least four instances
when fair use should be permitted in the commercial context. When transaction
costs are high and the fair user attributes greater value to the use of the work than
the loss suffered by the original author, it can be efficient to permit the fair use.
This is an application of the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency standard. 77 The problem,
' If there is no market for the work in its fair use, this does not mean the author still may not
prefer that it not be available in that use. Thus, it is possible that the author is worse off when a
non-commercial use is permitted. Still, these instances are likely to be the exceptions.
174 17 U.S.C. § 107(1).
1 17 U.S.C. § 107.
176 17 U.S.C. § 107(4).
17 See general, JEFFREY L. HARRISON, LAW AND ECONOMICS 59-60 (2002).
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as has been noted,' is that Kaldor-Hicks has more potential when an involuntary
transfer does not produce additional consequences. In the context of intellectual
property, involuntary transfers to other commercial uses can undermine author
incentives. Consequently, a transfer based on transaction cost problems alone is
something to be approached with great caution.
Second, there may be instances in which the fair use is commercial but the
user is unable to fully internalize the gains from the fair use. In these instances,
the value of the fair use may exceed the original author's loss, but that value may
not be reflected in the price the fair user is able to pay in a private transaction.
Here, the transaction would not have occurred at any price, so it is not really the
case that transaction costs are reduced. An involuntary transfer should not
undermine incentives, because the market transaction that occurs is not one the
author could have made. On the other hand, this application does lower the costs
of exclusivity.
Third, there are instances in which a possible fair use is entirely commercial.
Here the analysis very closely tracks the new use analysis. From an economic
perspective, the question is whether allowing the fair use will decrease incentives
sufficiently to offset any benefits from the use by the new author. The operative
considerations here are the bargain between the state and the author, the author's
reasonable expectations, and foreseeability. A use that usurps a market the author
would have anticipated exploiting can have a negative impact on incentives. On
the other hand, there is little reason not to permit fair use when the use involves
a market the author would not have counted within an expected income stream
when creating the work. Put differently, if fair use were not applied and the
author compensated, could that compensation be viewed as a windfall?
There is one more possibility that fits the wholly commercial category.
Suppose the new use is one that the copyright holder knows exists but would
never exploit herself. For example, the author of a book probably would not
write a review of it or create a parody that holds the original work up to ridicule.
Such an effort could undercut the value of the original work in the eyes of the
public. On the other hand, although that use is likely to have a negative effect
from the point of view of the original author, it might also result in significant
social benefit. Efforts to purchase the rights by the potential fair user may fail,
not because the social benefit does not exceed any harm to the author, but
because the author holds monopoly power with respect to the work. In fact,
"harm to the author" is a somewhat misleading framework within which to
analyze this. Intellectual property, unlike conventional property, is not consumed.
Thus, copyright holders cannot link their losses to mutually exclusive uses. This
178 See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 569 n.9, 225 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 1073, 1084 n.9 (1985) (citing Gordon, supra note 171).
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"hold out" by the monopolist is a form of transaction cost that can be avoided
by permitting fair use in those instances in which monopoly power is used to
block socially beneficial uses. Section 107 of the Act captures this idea with the
list of non-infringing uses that includes "criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching,... scholarship or research.',
17 9
Steps one and four of the statutory fair use analysis-the nature of the use and
the impact on the market for the original-are largely consistent with a rational
approach to positive externalities. Steps two and three of the fair use test are not
as obviously subject to economic tests. Step two-"the nature of the copyrighted
work"'s--has been interpreted to mean that certain works are "closer to the core
of intended copyright protection."'' The idea is that fictional works are to be
protected more than those based on fact. Or, the greater creativity found in a
work, the less likely that a user without permission will be able to successfully
claim that he or she made a "fair use." This step blends into the general idea of
protecting works when the social benefits exceed the costs.'82 One of the reasons
for not protecting ideas, facts, and scenes afaire at all are that the social costs
associated with exclusivity are relatively high. Although "close or not close" to
the core may suggest "important or not important," in actuality works that are not
close to the core are so important that people cannot exclude others from their
use. Thus, a liberal application of fair use when works are not "closer to the
core" clearly lowers costs associated with exclusivity in a context in which those
costs could be quite high. From the economic/cost reducing perspective, the
third part of the test-"the amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole"' 3-- is primarily important in not
extending fair use so far as to essentially undercut the incentives of the original
author. In effect, it puts a limit on the amount that can be taken so that it does
not exceed that which is needed for the socially beneficial use.
In general, Section 107 of the Act dovetails very nicely with an economic
approach to positive externalities except in one important respect. As already
noted, step four of the analysis examines the impact of the potential fair use on
the value of the original work, a process that has a chicken-and-egg character to
it. The value must be determined in order to assess the impact of the use, but the
value itself is a function of the breadth of protection including what uses are to
be regarded as fair uses. A positive externalities approach avoids the question by
179 U.S.C. § 107.
180 U.S.C. § 107(2).
... Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music,.Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1961, 1968
(1994).
182 See supra text accompanying notes 5-9.
183 U.S.C. § 107(3).
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asking in a more direct way what the impact will be of a finding of fair use on the
social cost of protecting the work and the incentive for future producers.
The fact that fair use standards can be interpreted to reflect an economically
rational approach to positive externalities is a different matter than whether they
actually have been interpreted in this way. The leading Supreme Court discussion
of fair use to date is found in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. "4 The facts, no
doubt familiar to even those with a passing interest in copyright law, involve the
use by the rap group 2 Live Crew of the Roy Orbison song "Pretty Woman."
The rights to the song were held by Acuff-Rose. The case is an excellent one for
analysis because the use is extensive and exclusively commercial. In addition,
private transaction costs were likely to be low 5 and the users likely to fully
internalize any gains from the use. In these instances it is likely that the parties
themselves could bargain to determine the most efficient use of "Pretty Woman."
Two aspects of the Court's opinion are particularly significant. First, in
applying the first step of the fair use test, the Court held that parody was the type
of "purpose" that would cut in favor of finding that the use was "fair." In effect,
parody is commentary and has the potential to be transformative.8 6 Second, with
respect to the fourth test, the Court noted that a transformative use is unlikely to
have an impact on the market for the original work by virtue of acting as a
substitute." 7 The Court also noted that the effect of decreasing demand as a
result of criticism is not equivalent to substituting one work for another.' This
is a critical point and in keeping with the treatment of conventional property. In
effect, just as one's property right in the conventional sense does not extend so
far as to stop others from commenting about how that property is used,
intellectual property rights also cannot be used to block commentary. In this case,
the reasoning of the Court tracks very closely a positive externalities approach.
There are actually two related ways to reach this conclusion, First, because
intellectual property can be used to satisfy two different demands simultaneously,
2 Live Crew's version of "Pretty Woman" was unlikely to have an impact on the
ability of Acuff-Rose to further exploit the work in any market reasonably
anticipated by the composers.' 89 In effect, by limiting Acuff-Rose's exclusivity,
1s4 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
185 2 Live Crew attempted to purchase the rights to make a record of a parody of "Pretty
Woman" and were refused. Id. at 572.
'86 Id. at 579-81.
187 Id. at 590-92.
188 The Court ultimately reversed the Court of Appeals, holding that the use was not a fair use
on the basis of that court's erroneous view that the commercial nature of the parody, in light of the
first step of the four-factor test, made the use presumptively unfair. Id. at 594.
189 The Court did, however, note the possibility that the work could impact Acuff-Rose's ability
to license the work to others desiring to create a rap version. The failure of 2 Live Crew to address
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social welfare was increased without a cost to Acuff-Rose. Second, even though
the parody might decrease the demand for the original, demand-decreasing works
are not the type that the author would have originally exploited, and the value to
society of commentary leading to spending decisions is higher than gains
internalized by the authors as a result of decreased information.'
90
The Court's earlier decision in Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nations
Enterprises' is also one that can be squared with a positive externalities approach.
The case dealt with President Ford's memoirs that were to be published as a
book. An excerpt was also to be published by Time magazine. The Nation came
to possess portions of the manuscript prior to either authorized publication and
used them in an article that essentially scooped Time. Here, The Nation sought the
shelter of "fair use," arguing that its publication was news. An important aspect
of the opinion is the Court's handling of the argument that as an unpublished
work, fair use should be applied more liberally. The Court rejected this view,
applied the four-factor test and held that the use was not fair. In effect, the use
was commercial and had an instant impact on the market for the rights to the
work. There was little public benefit to prepublication by The Nation. Whatever
benefit there might have been was clearly offset by the negative effect on
incentives of a holding that one may steal the commercial property of an author
and sell it with impunity.
A more controversial recent case in which the economically correct call is a
closer one is Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co.'92 The fair use issue arose with
respect to the book "The Wind Done Gone," which, as the title suggests, was a
parody' 93 of "Gone With the Wind," told from the point of view of a slave. "The
Wind Done Gone" specifically addresses the cultural biases and inaccuracies of
the original work by retelling the story. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit held that the new book did constitute a "fair use."'
' 94
The commercial purpose of the new work at least creates the possibility that
finding that it is a fair use will have an impact on demand for the original work
and on the incentives of future authors. Here that possibility would be weighed
against the decreased exclusivity with respect to the original work and the social
gains from a commentary of possible significance. A general rule that a work may
be "mined" in order to produce another work that ridicules the first work can
have a disincentive effect. The danger would be that the second author could
this issue meant that summary judgment for 2 Live Crew was withheld. Id.
190 For a subsequent application of Acuff-Rose, see Leibovit( v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d
109, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1834 (2d Cit. 1998).
191 471 U.S. 539, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1073 (1985).
192 268 F.3d 1257, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225 (11th Cir. 2001).
193 The court applies a broad definition of parody to include an effort to "comment." Id. at 1268.
194 Id. at 1276.
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essentially free-ride on the original in order to write a shadow version of that
work that undercuts the popularity of the original. In fact, it may even alter the
theme and expression of future original fictional works, especially those with
historical bases. On the other hand, the threat may also encourage the author
purporting to offer something that is historically accurate to use greater care.
In the context of "Gone with the Wind," this analysis seems strained because
the work already existed and has been extensively exploited. Thus, it bears
emphasizing that the issue is what the impact is on future "Gone With the Wind"
authors. Here, there are market elements that decrease the disincentives a finding
of fair use may give rise to. By its nature, a parody can only be successful if the
consuming public is familiar with the original work; parodies-whether in music
or literature-are produced about works that are widely known and usually
known in some detail. In effect, most authors are likely driven to create works
that are successful enough that a parody of that work'95 by another author would
make economic sense.'96 The possibility of a parody, even one that borrows
heavily, is unlikely to keep an author from writing the most popular work
possible.
This does leave the strained possibility that an author makes tremendous
efforts to create an enormously popular work because he or she then anticipates
the opportunity to sell the "parody rights" to that work. A finding of "fair use,"
so the argument might go, would mean there is less to "sell" by creating the work
and therein lies a disincentive. In the context of "Gone with the Wind," this was
almost certainly not the case. In the context of future authors, it seems unlikely
to be what, at the margin, motivates their creativity. Moreover, a view that the
author owns the "parody rights" can be a socially costly one. It may effectively
block important commentary resulting from the original author's refusal to sell
or from transaction costs stemming from bilateral monopoly conditions."'
When these factors are balanced, the court in Suntrust seems to have made the
right decision from the point of view of minimizing the costs of the copyright-
worthy work. This is not to say, however, that the court expressed itself in terms
that suggested an economic orientation toward social benefits and positive
externalities. The one noteworthy exception is its analysis of the fourth prong of
the fair use test-"the effect on the market value of the original."' 98 In that
discussion, the Court focuses on the impact on the value of derivative rights to
s It is important to remember that the parody must be of the work itself. The generalized use
of a work to ridicule a third work or to make a more general commentary is usually not a fair use.
196 In the unlikely event an author decided to create a parody of an unpopular work, it would be
difficult for the author of the original to show that the market had been diverted by the parody.
197 As an economic matter, conditions under which there is one buyer and one seller can give rise
to strategy behavior and an impasse.
19 Suntrust, 268 F.3d at 1274.
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"Gone With the Wind." It notes that whatever value there may be with respect
to these rights is greatly diminished by the fact that the work was nearing the end
of its copyright term.'99 From an economic perspective, the application of fair use
near the end of a copyright term will be less costly in terms of author incentives
than an early term application.
Less encouraging from the standpoint of a rational positive externalities
approach to copyright is the decision of a panel of the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals in Rogers v. Koons.2" Jeff Koons, a sculptor, created a work based on a
photograph by Art Rogers of a group of puppies. There was no question that
Koons copied Rogers's work carefully except that it was a large multi-colored
sculpture. Koons's "fair use defense" was based on parody. Here the court
defined parody as "when one artist, for comic effect or social commentary, closely
imitates the style of another artist and in so doing creates a new art work that
makes ridiculous the style and expression of the original."2"' The court found that
Koons failed the test because the work was intended to be a more general
commentary on the superficiality of society at large.202 This particular finding
seems somewhat extraordinary. One wonders how Koons could use the original
work to comment on American tastes and not be commenting on the work he
uses to illustrate the point. The case is quite different from the typical one in
which a party uses the style of an original work. 3 or the melody of a song to make
fun of a completely different work.
The court's reasoning with respect to the fourth fair use test-the impact of
the value of the original-is even more puzzling. According to the court, the test
is "whether defendants... planned to profit.., without paying... for the use of
[the] photo. ' '204 Whether the defendants planned to profit is a different question
from the impact on the value of the original work and on the incentives of the
author. It is also suggested that Koons's use reduced the value of the
photograph. Of course, as the Supreme Court noted in Acuff-Rose, reduced
demand stemming from ridicule or criticism is not something from which
copyright protects the author.2 " In a broader context, a decision the other way
would have lowered the costs of exclusivity and transacting while having little if
any significant impact on the demand for Rogers's work other than the possibility
of exposing its superficiality. The decision seems off-base from an economic
199 Id. at 1275.
200 960 F.2d 301, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1492 (2d Cir. 1992).
201 Id. at 309-10.
202 Id. at 310.
203 Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books, U.S.A., Inc., 109 F.3d 1394,42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1184 (9th Cir. 1997).
204 Rogers, 960 F.2d at 312.
205 See supra text accompanying notes 184-90.
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perspective, and there is language in the opinion that suggests the court was
simply disgusted with Koons.
20 6
A final case and a closer one in terms of positive externalities is Princeton
University Press v. Michigan Documents Services, Inc. (MDS). °7 The case deals with the
production of "coursepacks" or collections of photocopied materials for
classroom use. The Copyright Act itself provides that copying "for purposes...
[of] teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use) . . . is not an
infringement."2 ° As the court notes, the determination of whether any particular
use, including an educational use, is a fair use depends on the four-factor analysis.
The defendant, the manufacturer and seller of coursepacks, argued that the
activity was a fair use. In a deeply divided en bane opinion, the Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit held that it was not.
A critical element of the court's analysis was the fourth step of the fair use test.
The majority was persuaded that there was an impact on the value of the original
by virtue of the fact that publishers often charged licensing fees to those who
copied from their publications.2" The dissenting judges argued that the students
could have photocopied the works on their own and that would have been a fair
use."'0 The use of a third party to perform the same function, so the argument
goes, does not change the substance of the use and actually lowers the costs to the
students. In fact, from this point of view, the copy centers simply facilitated a fair
use in a manner that was substantively no different from someone delivering a
book to a student who later photocopies part of it. Moreover, since professors
assigning the coursepacks would not require the students to purchase the books
in which specific articles were found, there would be no impact on the market for
the original. The dissent's argument on this point is a tad overstated. Nothing
in the majority opinion will require students to photocopy their materials. They
can do that or they can pay a copy center to do the same thing and pay a price
that reflects a licensing fee. When done by a copy center, whatever efficiencies
result from mass copying will not be lost.
The case presents a number of interesting wrinkles. First, how can one know
whether a use lowers the value of a work without first knowing that value-a
determination that depends on the fair use decision itself?. Second, although the
publishers may have received licensing fees, there appears to be no indication that
particular articles were written by authors or included in specific collections by
publishers as a result of potential licensing fees. Still, the fees are beneficial to
206 Rogers, 960 F.2d at 303-05.
99 F.3d 1381, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641 (6th Cir. 1996).
208 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2003).
209 MDS, 99 F.3d at 1386-88.
210 Id. at 1393-94.
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publishers and likely to make it possible to publish more than would otherwise
be the case. Third, while the ultimate use by the students was noncommercial,
the intermediate copying was a commercial endeavor. Finally, in many respects,
the publishers were serving the same function as MDS in that they collected and
made available the creative works of others.
A positive externalities approach is able to side-step some of these interesting
questions and focus on the specific issue-given that the photocopied works are
worthy of protection, what is the minimum social cost that will assure their
production? More specifically, at the margin, is the licensing fee necessary to
bring these works to market? First, as far as the actual authors are concerned, this
seems unlikely. As noted in the case, most academic writing is not done in hopes
of obtaining a profit from limited circulation. Writing of that nature is largely
motivated as part of a job requirement and by potential professional
advancement.
Second, with respect to publishers, does the potential for licensing fees
increase the likelihood of specific works becoming available to the public? This
is a different question from whether the publishing industry is healthier or
whether the volume of works published will increase. No doubt the ability to
collect licensing fees is beneficial to the industry. On one hand, the health of the
industry is disconnected from an incentive to publish particular articles within a
collection of works. This makes the majority decision in MDS look more like an
effort to subsidize publishers generally without regard to what is published and
any incentive effects on authors. This may be a laudable goal, but "industry
subsidization" seems outside the scope of the Copyright Act. On the other hand,
a licensing fee right may make publishers sensitive to works that are likely to be
the subject of reprinting requests. At least in theory, creating an incentive to
publish works that are likely to be important to students and their instructors may
itself be the source of a substantial public benefit.
On balance, MDS is a hard one to call. Even though the Copyright Act itself
does not have a generalized industry subsidization goal, the question can be raised
as to whether a positive externalities should factor this in. There is good reason
for addressing the question. Copyright is ultimately about public goods, and in
the context of many other public goods a general subsidization is necessary for
the good or service to be produced at all. In the case of publications like those
involved in MDS, however, this may be a point that is ultimately irrelevant.
Increasingly, works like those found in university press publications are available
at various internet web sites for little or no charge. In effect, technology seems
well on the way toward supplanting ordinary hard-copy publications. In sum,
while the licensing fee may not be the lowest-cost method of providing the
necessary incentives to encourage production of original works, it may also
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ultimately become irrelevant as a result of technological changes and market
adjustments.
Unlike copyright duration and the reactions of courts to new uses, "fair use"
analysis is often quite consistent with a positive externalities approach to
copyright. There is no question that the statute itself provides important guidance
in this regard. Most important is the express requirement that market impact be
part of a court's consideration.
VI. SUMMARY
Negative externalities result from activities that harm third parties. Contract
law, tort law, and, to some extent, criminal law are often seen as economically
rational responses to these harms. The principal goal is to insure internalization
of these costs by the party causing them so he or she may make a decision about
whether the benefits of the activity outweigh all the costs. Those responsible can
pay for the harm or take measures to avoid the harm. In some instances, the
economically rational outcome is for the harm to occur. Thus, the goal is not
simply to avoid harm but to minimize the cost of the harm and measures taken
to avoid it. There are actually two steps to the analysis. First, what harms should
be avoided? Second, how can those harms be avoided at the lowest cost?
This Article is an effort to "flip" this analysis to positive externalities and apply
it to copyright law. As with negative externalities, there are two crucial questions.
First, when do the benefits of protecting a creative effort exceed the social costs
of doing so? The social costs are those associated with exclusivity, administering
the copyright system, and any increase in transaction costs resulting from the
protection. The second question is how to protect the work and incur the lowest
possible social cost.
The principle focus of this Article is to assess the success or failure of
copyright law to live up to this "positive externalities" approach. When it comes
to the question of which works to protect, copyright law performs surprisingly
well. Doctrines like scenes a faire, the uncopyrightability of facts, and the
idea/expression distinction go a long way toward avoiding costs associated with
exclusivity without creating disincentives. Flexibility in defining the "thinness"
and "thickness" for protection is also used to effectively address this first
question. In general, whether through evolution, reasoning, or coincidence, the
rules that have emerged tend to resemble those to which an economic approach
would lead.
Copyright law performs far less well when it comes to protecting works at the
lowest possible social cost. In order to make this assessment, three specific areas
of the law were examined. Theories were presented for each with respect to how
a positive externalities approach would be applied. The first area was copyright
[Vol. 13:1
2005] POSITIVE EXTERNALITIES TO COPYRIGHT LAW 59
duration. Here there appears to be no connection between the period of
protection and minimizing the costs of protection. Copyright terms are actually
indeterminate and far longer than necessary to protect most works. The excessive
time probably adds little to the store of creative works, but creates substantial
risks of prolonged and expensive battles over the revenues produced by a work.
The treatment of new uses and new technology fair only slightly better than
copyright terms. The critical issue in this context is foreseeability. New uses that
are unforeseeable and extend the protected work into a new market are irrelevant
to creative effort and can result in social costs. It is in this area that courts seem
to stick to formalistic line-drawing without a great deal of sensitivity to policy.
This is not to say that the outcomes are always inconsistent with a positive
externalities approach. Even when they are, however, the reasoning does not
engender a great deal of confidence that a rational and predictable social welfare-
maximizing perspective is at work.
The final area examined-"fair use"-presents quite a different story. The
doctrine is generally applied in a manner that is consistent with reducing the social
costs of protecting copyright-worthy materials. Largely guided by the statute
itself, which dovetails with a positive externalities approach, courts exhibit a
sensitivity to how much "fair use" can be permitted before there is an
unacceptable impact on incentives. The places for error in this analysis stem from
two sources. To some extent, courts may focus on the benefits to a fair user as
opposed to the harm and disincentive to the original author.21' Second, in some
instances, the reasoning and outcomes could be improved by a broader
perspective assessing whether disputes actually have implications for future
creativity or are simply struggles over the distribution of profits.212
211 Although the profits earned as a result of an infringement are recoverable along with damages
this is part of the remedy for infringement. The test for whether there is an infringement does not
factor in the benefits to the alleged infringer independent of harm to the author. A close reading
of Rogers v. Koons, see text at notes 200-06, supra, suggests the court may have been as concerned with
the profit made by the infringers as it was with the impact on the author of the original.
212 See generaly Harrison, supra note 24.

